Iran: Winner or Loser of the “Arab Spring”?

Fürtig, Henner

doi:10.1057/9781137484758_2

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Por ejemplo, el ayatola Ali Jamenei, en diversas oportunidades, expresaba a sus hermanos correligionarios de la región que los eventos desarrollados en países como Túnez, Egipto, Libia y Bahréin eran la continuación del mismo despertar islámico que ocasionó la Revolución iraní de 1979. Sin embargo, ante circunstancias equiparables en Siria, su postura fue completamente diferente, pues asoció los levantamientos a teorías conspiratorias, a la ilegítima interferencia de poderes extranjeros, y en consecuencia reafirmó el apoyo a una solución que no condujera necesariamente a la salida del poder del presidente Bashar al-Assad (Alfoneh, 2011;Fürtig, 2014). Ante estas circunstancias, es oportuno cuestionar esta ambivalencia; ¿por qué estas sublevaciones en Siria no tuvieron el mismo apoyo de Irán que obtuvieron los levantamientos y revueltas en Túnez, Egipto, Libia y Bahréin?…”

Section: Siria Y Los Efectos De La Primavera áRabe En Los Intereses I...unclassified

La estrategia de expansionismo hegemónico iraní en Siria y Afganistán

Visbal

Barceló

2020

Rev. Cient. Gen. José María Córdova

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En las últimas décadas, Irán ha puesto en marcha un ambicioso programa de política exterior en el cual uno de sus objetivos fundamentales es promover su expansionismo hegemónico a lo largo de zonas de especial interés regional. Este artículo investiga la agenda desarrollada por Irán en Afganistán y Siria, en medio de dos guerras y contextos territoriales diferentes. A pesar de las diferencias, este trabajo evidencia los elementos comunes de su estrategia expansionista en Asia central y Medio Oriente. Esta estrategia se basa en el rechazo de la intervención de EE. UU. y sus aliados, y la reivindicación de un régimen político-religioso islámico. En los casos analizados, Irán ha mezclado el apoyo político y militar con la ayuda económica y el fortalecimiento de lazos comerciales con estos países.

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Section: Siria Y Los Efectos De La Primavera áRabe En Los Intereses I...unclassified

La estrategia de expansionismo hegemónico iraní en Siria y Afganistán

Visbal

Barceló

2020

Rev. Cient. Gen. José María Córdova

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“…Thus, as early as February 2011, Israel got reassurance from the top of the Egyptian military that the peace treaty between the two countries would be maintained (Berti, 2013). However, some other Middle Eastern actors gained relative power: Turkey (Altunışık, 2014), Iran (Fürtig, 2014), Saudi Arabia (Al Tamamy, 2014), and also Qatar (Machowski, 2011), as well as the newly emerged Islamic State (Inbar, 2016).…”

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“Watching and waiting” and “much ado about nothing”? Making sense of the Israeli response to the Arab uprisings

Beck

2016

Palgrave Commun

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This article covers Israel's response to the Arab uprisings. The analysis deals with the issue of both material and immaterial political actions of the Israeli political leadership. A theoretical approach based on "thin rationalism"-actors pursue strategies based on their preferences-encompassing orthodox and heterodox schools of thought of International Relations (Neo-Realism, Institutionalism, Liberalism and a Copenhagen Schoolinspired concept of international securitization) is developed and applied to the case. The article contributes to the solution of a research puzzle. On the one hand, Israel's material political action followed a watching-and-waiting approach, as Israel refrained from actively interfering in the domestic affairs of Arab countries highly affected by the Arab uprisings. On the other hand, in terms of political communication, major executive branches of the Israeli state pursued a harsh policy: the "Arab Spring" was presented to the global public as a dangerous threat to Israel's security. Major results at the empirical level are that Israel-seen through the spectacles of the three orthodox schools of thought-was never seriously threatened by the Arab uprisings, which contributes to explaining why Israel's material policy was rather equanimous. At the same time, the harsh Israeli policy at the level of political communication is made sense of as a policy that added to Israel's attempts to legitimize its occupation of Palestine toward the (Western-dominated) international community. At the theoretical level, further application of the securitization approach aimed at the international level is encouraged. This article is published as part of a collection on analyzing security complexes in a changing Middle East.

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Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement

Bahi

2017

The International Spectator

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Iran: Winner or Loser of the “Arab Spring”?

Cited by 3 publications

References 2 publications

La estrategia de expansionismo hegemónico iraní en Siria y Afganistán

La estrategia de expansionismo hegemónico iraní en Siria y Afganistán

“Watching and waiting” and “much ado about nothing”? Making sense of the Israeli response to the Arab uprisings

Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement

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