Irony as a Political Demarcation Tool of the New Russian Nationalists

Abstract

The article discusses how and why the new nationalists, who call for political self-determination of Russians but share some ideological concepts with liberals, use stiob - a form of ironic parody based on overidentification and decontextualisation, resulting in destruction of the authoritative discourse. Their entertaining, or educational-cum-entertaining projects, located in the gray area between politics and counterculture, strive to undermine domineering political discourses (liberal, neo-Soviet, leftist, official patriotic, and old nationalist) and to go beyond the left-right dichotomy. The author concludes that the main function of stiob and other forms of irony for the new nationalists is negative identification. Ambivalence of the language of stiob simultaneously attracts the target audience of nationalists (“those in the know”) and does not prevent solidarizing with any political platform when needed. The article is based on qualitative analysis of narratives produced by nationalist social media influencers, including fiction, essays, talks, lectures, interviews, live broadcasts, posts in blogs, social networks and messengers.

Satirical strikes and deadpanning diplomats: Stiob as geopolitical performance in Russia–US relations

“…It has lost the ambiguities of the original late-socialist aesthetic and as it's done so merged into other post-ironic forms embraced by right-wing actors globally (Greene et al 2021). At the same time, it jostled and co-existed with a host of more ambivalent pro-state productions, including commodified forms (Cassiday and Johnson 2010;Skvirskaja 2016;Mitrofanova 2020). In some cases, as Vera Skvirskaja (2016) notes, stiob "jammed" ostensibly patriotic forms, simultaneously signaling support for the regime whilst questioning it.…”

“…Originating as a countercultural aesthetic and mode of performativity that developed in the discursive and ideological context of late socialism (1970s–1980s), stiob has paradoxically thrived in conditions of late liberalism and extended to take on other forms of authoritative discourse quite different from its origins in the late decades of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Indeed, in an interesting transmutation of late socialist forms, post‐Soviet Russian stiob has turned against a newly felt and resented form of authoritative discourse—a presumed ossified and dogmatic Western liberalism and the language of political correctness (Boyer and Yurchak 2010; Hemment 2018; Mitrofanova 2020). At the same time, as a particular genre of humor, stiob has globalized, proliferating in late capitalist media culture beyond formerly socialist states.…”

“…2021). At the same time, it jostled and co‐existed with a host of more ambivalent pro‐state productions, including commodified forms (Cassiday and Johnson 2010; Skvirskaja 2016; Mitrofanova 2020). In some cases, as Vera Skvirskaja (2016) notes, stiob “jammed” ostensibly patriotic forms, simultaneously signaling support for the regime whilst questioning it.…”

“…Humor and playfulness spike in these “collaborative efforts in which performance, response, rebuke and meaning‐making include mass audiences engaging across multiple platforms” (Davis, Love and Killen 2018, 390). Meanwhile, despite tightened government control, the Russian Internet (RUNET) remained a relatively free public space; until 2020 it was a riotous and irony‐suffused domain, responsive to global trends (Mitrofanova 2020). Political communication took place within and was shaped by a complex and humor saturated digital media ecology in which meaning developed in fragmented and decentered ways.…”

“…1111For discussion of the US‐based far‐right and its digital harnessing of satire see Greene (2019) and Nagle (2017); for a rich account of Russia's “new nationalist” social media influencers see Mitrofanova (2020). …”