Is A Purely First Person Account Of Human Action Defensible?

Is the “act itself” of separating a pregnant woman and her previable child neither good nor bad morally, considered in the abstract? Recently, Maureen Condic and Donna Harrison have argued that such separation is justified to protect the mother’s life and that it does not constitute an abortion as the aim is not to kill the child. In our article on maternal–fetal conflicts, we agree there need be no such aim to kill (supplementing aims such as to remove). However, we argue that to understand “abortion” as performed only where the death of the child is intended is to define the term too narrowly. Respect for the mother, the fetus, and the bond between them goes well beyond avoiding any such aim. We distinguish between legitimate maternal treatments simply aimed at treating or removing a damaged part of the woman and illegitimate treatments that focus harmfully on the fetal body and its presence within the mother’s body. In obstetrics as elsewhere, not all side effects for one subject of intervention can be outweighed by intended benefits for another. Certain side effects of certain intended interventions are morally conclusive. Summary: How should one respond to “vital conflicts” in pregnancy where the mother’s life or health is at risk? We argue that, in addition to avoiding any aim of ending life, one must avoid the similarly unacceptable aims of evicting the baby pre-viability and invading its body, including its placenta, in a lethally harmful way. Even at the cost of real and important benefits for the mother such as increased safety and protection of fertility, we must manage cases always in a way that respects the inviolable bodily rights of both mother and child and crucially, the unique bond between them.

Section: “Intention” In Rival Natural Law Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting the Fetal Body and/or Mother–Child Connection: Vital Conflicts and Abortion

Watt¹,

McCarthy²

2019

“…Only the truthful articulation of that proposal can be a description that specifies an act for the purposes of moral analysis. (Grisez et al 2001, 29)For Grisez, Finnis, and Boyle and their followers (Tollefsen 2006; Brugger 2013; May 2013), the moral object is specified “only” by the agent’s proposal in the action, that is, what he sees and understands himself to be doing. The reason is that on their view, as demonstrated above, morality originates solely from the interior choice, which is then projected onto the external behavior in question.…”

Section: Erds 45 and 47: A Need For Clarificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first interpretation is the traditional natural law (TNL) theory which holds that the moral object in an indirect abortion involves not only that the abortion is unintended by the subject but also indirectly caused (Long 2008; Long 2013; Jensen 2014; Austriaco 2011; O’Brien and Koons 2012; Berg 2017; Haas 2017). The second and more novel interpretation referred to as the New Natural Law (NNL) theory is that a direct abortion refers only to abortions which the acting person does not intend, whether or not he immediately causes them (Finnis et al 2001; Tollefsen 2006; Rhonheimer 2009; Brugger 2013; May 2013). Since both sets of theologians consider themselves to be faithfully interpreting the Catholic moral tradition and the magisterial documents of Pope John Paul II, yet give opposing judgments, this situation presents a great difficulty for medical professionals and ethics committees who need to make decisions in concrete scenarios with the confidence that they are following sound moral reasoning and the ERDs for Catholic health care.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Redefining Direct and Indirect Abortions through “The Perspective of the Acting Person”: A Misreading of Veritatis Splendor

Alexander

2019

Despite sincere attempts to interpret Evangelium vitae and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops' (USCCB) Ethical and Religious Directives (ERDs) of Catholic Health Care on direct versus indirect abortion, Catholic moral theologians docile to the magisterium and to Pope John Paul II's teaching remain divided on how the ERDs should be interpreted based on the meaning of the word "direct." The traditional natural law theory holds that the moral object in an indirect abortion involves not only that the abortion is unintended by the subject but also indirectly caused. The second and more novel interpretation referred to as the New Natural Law (NNL) theory is that an indirect abortion refers only to abortions which the acting person does not intend, whether or not he immediately causes them. Because the novel view bases its entire revision of the moral object by considering only "the perspective of the acting person", a key text in Veritatis splendor no. 78, they argue that they are being faithful to Pope John Paul II's teaching in Veritatis splendor (VS) no. 78. In this article I argue that their reasoning is based on a fundamental misreading of Veritatis splendor and that the Pope himself would reject their view, even though they quote him, because their interpretation contradicts the fundamental moral principles that Pope John Paul II himself lays out within the very same chapter of Veritatis splendor. Furthermore, when the foundations of the broader NNL theory are brought to light, it becomes clear that the fundamental mistake at the root of this disputed question is that the NNL theory interprets the magisterial documents of Pope John Paul II through their own philosophical method-a method of moral analysis not shared by Pope John Paul II or the magisterium. When this interpretive error is brought to light, and Pope John Paul II is read on his own terms, it is clear that a direct abortion involves any attack on the unborn child that the acting person immediately and physically causes. Summary: The disputed question in Catholic health care concerning what constitutes a direct and indirect abortion can be resolved by examining the foundational differences of both the New Natural Law theory with the traditional natural law theory. Once these differences are brought to light, it is clear that the NNL has reinterpreted the meaning of the word "direct" based on a meaning that the magisterium has never accepted as a licit one for defining intrinsically evil acts. Furthermore, NNL thinkers misread Pope John Paul in Veritatis splendor 78 by applying their own novel methodology to the text. When this interpretive error is brought to light, it is clear that a direct abortion involves any attack on the unborn child that the acting person immediately and physically causes.

“…What matters morally is what a person chooses to bring about, not what the world brings about or other people bring about. The moral story of human agents is told in the first person and not the second or third person, in what “I choose” and not in what “you do,” “they accomplish,” or “the world causes.” 16…”

Section: How Wrong Is Contraception?mentioning

confidence: 99%

What is Right About the Contra-Life Argument Against Contraception?

Anderson

2010

The contra-life argument against contraception by Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis, and William May maintains that contraception is always and everywhere morally wrong because it involves a contra-life choice to impede new human life. This article develops four problems that people might have with the contra-life argument and then shows that none of those problems undercut the argument. The most serious problem is that the contra-life argument seems to fail to show adequately what is wrong with impeding new human life, and this article neutralizes that problem by showing that choices to impede new human life are wrong because they involve unreasonable self-preference. Finally, this article shows that the moral character of contraceptive use for non-contraceptive reasons is often difficult to determine.