Is China's Antidumping More Retaliatory than that of the US?

Abstract

Antidumping (AD) investigations are widespread. China and the US are two big users and targets of AD investigations. They, respectively, represent developing and developed countries on one hand, and new AD users and traditional AD users on the other. In this paper, using AD filing data of these two countries from 1991 to 2005, we explore whether China's AD is more retaliatory than that of the US. Our results obtained from negative binomial models with maximum likelihood techniques show that although both countries have some degree of retaliatory incentives in their AD filings, China is not more (or may even be less) retaliatory than the US. We also compare the two countries' similarities and differences in their AD responses to other factors such as macroeconomic conditions, contagions, and geographical distance.

Differences in the determinants and targeting of antidumping: China and India compared

“…However, India's retaliatory pattern is more similar to that of traditional users. Bao and Qiu (2011) find that retaliation has a negative effect on US AD filings, which mirrors what we have found in the case of India. An increase in AD use against each country in the previous year leads to fewer AD being initiated by each of them due to the threat of retaliation.…”

“…Bao and Qiu (2011) further distinguish a deflection effect from an "echo effect" in both the US and China AD filings, with the latter tending to cause these countries to launch more AD filings against countries that are already receiving AD filings from elsewhere.…”

“…The influence of the importing country's macroeconomic conditions on AD use has been identified by several studies (Knetter and Prusa, 2003;Feinberg, 2005;Blonigen, 2006;Francois and Niels, 2006;Moore and Zanardi, 2009;Bao and Qiu, 2011). One major finding is that more AD filings are to be expected with slower domestic economic growth.…”

“…In addition to retaliatory factors, strategic determinants include the spread of AD, namely a contagion effect (Bao and Qiu, 2011). Bown and Crowley (2006) consider how AD by the US against Japanese exports affected third markets through trade deflection, which raises the probability of trade protection by other countries.…”

“…AD against country j's exports by other countries will increase the incentive to file AD cases by firms in country i, since it increases these firms' expectation of affirmative determination by the government when AD filings are made. Such behavior is associated with information transmission of AD fillings across the parties involved (Bao and Qiu, 2011). …”