Is Cyber Strategy Possible?

Hoffman, Wyatt

doi:10.1080/0163660x.2019.1593665

Cited by 20 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Several US national security officials believe that AI, used as force multipliers for both defensive and offensive cyber weapons, will have a transformative impact on cybersecurity (Gartzke and Lindsay 2015;Wyatt 2019;Slayton 2017;Rid 2012). 16 Director of US National Intelligence, Daniel Coats, recently warned that AI could increase US vulnerability to cyberattacks, weaken its ability to attribute such attacks, improve the effectiveness and capabilities of adversaries weapon and intelligence systems, and cause accidents and related liability issues.…”

Section: Blurring the Ai-cyber Offence-defence Line: (Glaser And Kaufmann 1998; Lynn-jones 1995) 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, most observers now acknowledge that no strategy (i.e. combining offence and defence cyber operations) could realistically be expected to deter all malign cyber-attacks (Hoffman 2019). 21 While AI-enhanced cyber capabilities can enhance deterrence, they can simultaneously incentivize others to attack thereby exacerbating the paradox of enhanced capabilities and increased vulnerabilities in the cyber domain (Slayton 2017;Gartzke and Lindsay 2017;Libicki 2016).…”

Section: Blurring the Ai-cyber Offence-defence Line: (Glaser And Kaufmann 1998; Lynn-jones 1995) 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At a strategic level of conflict, AI applications designed to enhance cybersecurity for nuclear forces could simultaneously make cyber-dependent nuclear weapon systems 21 Unlike nuclear deterrence, cyber deterrence does not necessarily fail if an attack is launched (Hoffman 2019). 22 Several scholars argue that the use of offensive cyber capabilities at a strategic level of conflict is either operationally difficult or subject to successful deterrence from adversaries.…”

Section: Cybersecurity and Nuclear Weapon Systems: Nuclear Risk Redux?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SeeGlaser and Kaufmann (1998) andLynn-Jones (1995).16 Most defence analysts agree that cyberwarfare is 'offensive-dominant' in nature. SeeGartzke and Lindsay (2015),Hoffman (2019) andSlayton (2017). For an opposing view, seeRid (2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability

Johnson

2019

Journal of Cyber Policy

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How could AI-infused cyber capabilities be used to subvert, or otherwise compromise, the reliability, control and use of states' nuclear forces? This article argues that a new generation of artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced cyber capabilities will amplify the risk of inadvertent escalation caused by the co-mingling of nuclear and strategic non-nuclear weapons and the increasing speed of warfare, thereby increasing the risk of nuclear confrontation. It examines the potential implications of cyber (offensive and defensive) capabilities augmented with AI applications for nuclear security. The article concludes that future iterations of AI-enhanced cyber counterforce capabilities will complicate the existing challenges of cyber defence, and in turn, compromise nuclear assets and increase the escalatory effects of offensive cyber capabilities.

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Section: Blurring the Ai-cyber Offence-defence Line: (Glaser And Kaufmann 1998; Lynn-jones 1995) 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Blurring the Ai-cyber Offence-defence Line: (Glaser And Kaufmann 1998; Lynn-jones 1995) 15mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cybersecurity and Nuclear Weapon Systems: Nuclear Risk Redux?mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability

Johnson

2019

Journal of Cyber Policy

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Defending Iran

Bahgat¹,

Ehteshami²

2021

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Since the 1979 revolution, the ruling establishment of Iran has developed and articulated a defense strategy reflective of the country's Iran-Iraq war experience and its international isolation. Its asymmetrical warfare doctrine, use of irregular forces in military campaigns, deployment of ballistic missiles, use of fast naval vessels to harass and confuse adversaries, and finally development of a sophisticated cyber warfare capability, are all features of this unique defense strategy. Based on a wide range of primary sources in Persian, Arabic and English, Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushiravan Ehteshami offer a detailed and authoritative analysis of Iran's defense strategy. Additionally, this book provides a comparative analysis of the Islamic Republic's capabilities in relation to Israel and Saudi Arabia, its main regional adversaries. Framing Tehran's threat perceptions following the revolution within a wider historical context, this book will facilitate further analytical reflections on the country's changing role in the region, and its relations further afield, with the United States, Europe, Russia and China.

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Preface

2021

Defending Iran

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Is Cyber Strategy Possible?

Cited by 20 publications

References 0 publications

The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability

The AI-cyber nexus: implications for military escalation, deterrence and strategic stability

Defending Iran

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