Is Verstehen Scientific Understanding?

Abstract

Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of understanding (Verstehen) that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the last decade or so, epistemologists and philosophers of natural science have been proffering analyses of a kind of natural-scientific understanding. Using examples from educational psychology and anthropology, I argue that there are prima facie reasons to think these recent accounts of natural-scientific understanding impose necessary conditions on Verstehen. This suggests that any claim about Verstehen's distinctiveness faces hitherto-unappreciated burdens of proof.

The Source of Epistemic Normativity: Scientific Change as an Explanatory Problem

“…I acknowledge that we may detect differences in the explanatory patterns used by the various disciplines but these differences should not be understood as following a clear-cut division between the world of human beings and the rest of the natural world. I agree with perspectives which suggest that “ [t]he types of knowledge gained of the social world are much like the types of knowledge we can claim of the biological world” (Mitchell 2009a, 131; see also Kaiser and Plenge 2014, 2; Khalifa 2019, 287-8; Scholz 2014). I take for granted that there is a plurality in the logical form of explanations employed by the various empirical sciences.…”

“…Nonetheless, my account is at odds with Hermeneutics on at least three crucial levels: (a) Normative judgements which sustain normative explanations, as I attempted to present them, are constrained by the conditions of possibility determined by the totality of the empirical sciences. In this sense, my account is a (moderate) version of naturalism; (b) Hermeneutic understanding is empathetic, which means that it presupposes “some kind of accurate simulation of another’s [subject] mental states and processes” (Khalifa 2019, 283). In contradistinction with this kind of understanding, I argued in §5.2 that normative explanations are not restricted only to cases in which the individual thinkers cogitate with an appreciation of good reason; (c) the determination of the normative judgments which sustain normative explanations is not exclusively the result of a priori conceptual analysis.…”

“…It is also not to be equated with scientific understanding. As Khalifa (2019, 284) notes, “‘understanding’ [is] the genus that includes both Verstehen and scientific understanding.” 8 In what follows, I use the terms “understanding” and “making intelligible” interchangeably. Both denote the thorough comprehension or knowledge of the phenomenon under examination which is no other than scientific change.…”

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

“…We highlight two reasons to think that Khalifa’s account of understanding is especially promising as a basis for explanatory integration. First, as Khalifa (2019) argues, his is among the most demanding philosophical accounts of understanding. Consequently, it serves as a useful ideal to which scientists should aspire.…”

Anglosakson Arkeoloji Geleneği Bağlamında Bilimsel Açıklamaların Doğası ve Statüsü

“…Bu bağlamda Danilo M. Campanaro (2021) arkeolojide EİAÇ metodunun yarattığı güçlüklerin çözümü için bir öneride bulunur. Campanaro, Jean C.Gardin'in (2002) tanımladığı çıkarım mantığını analiz eder ve bunu EİAÇ metoduna arkeolojik akıl yürütmeleri kaydetmek ve açık kılmak amacıyla adapte eder.25 Verstehen ile bilimsel anlayış (scientific understanding) arasındaki ilişkinin bir analizi için bkz;(Khalifa, 2019).…”