“…Some of these problems have to do with the capacity of the framework to account for traditional folk psychological distinctions between belief and desire (see e.g., Dewhurst, 2017; Klein, 2018; Yon, Heyes, & Press, 2020), although its defenders have argued that it can account for desire in a novel way (Clark, 2020; Wilkinson, Deane, Nave, & Clark, 2019). Another, very common, kind of critique is that the framework either does not enjoy any empirical support, or that the FEP is empirically inadequate (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), and should therefore be considered to offer, at best, a redescription of existing data (see e.g., Cao, 2020; Colombo et al, 2018; Liwtin & Miłkowski, 2020). Yet another kind of critique argues that there is no significant connection between the (a priori) FEP formalism on the one hand, and the (empirical) process theories it is intended to support on the other (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), or that it presents a false equivocation between probability and adaptive value (Colombo, 2020).…”