2021
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-021-01722-0
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Is the brain an organ for free energy minimisation?

Abstract: Two striking claims are advanced on behalf of the free energy principle (FEP) in cognitive science and philosophy: (i) that it identifies a condition of the possibility of existence for self-organising systems; and (ii) that it has important implications for our understanding of how the brain works, defining a set of process theories—roughly, theories of the structure and functions of neural mechanisms—consistent with the free energy minimising imperative that it derives as a necessary feature of all self-orga… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Another, very common, kind of critique is that the framework either does not enjoy any empirical support, or that the FEP is empirically inadequate (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), and should therefore be considered to offer, at best, a redescription of existing data (see e.g., Cao, 2020; Colombo et al, 2018; Liwtin & Miłkowski, 2020). Yet another kind of critique argues that there is no significant connection between the (a priori) FEP formalism on the one hand, and the (empirical) process theories it is intended to support on the other (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), or that it presents a false equivocation between probability and adaptive value (Colombo, 2020). Other works, such as Di Paolo, Thompson, and Beer (2021) and Raja, Valluri, Baggs, Chemero, and Anderson (2021) have recently disputed claims about the FEP representing a general unifying principle, claiming that it fails to account for different sensorimotor aspects of embodied and (autopoietic) enactive cognition.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Another, very common, kind of critique is that the framework either does not enjoy any empirical support, or that the FEP is empirically inadequate (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), and should therefore be considered to offer, at best, a redescription of existing data (see e.g., Cao, 2020; Colombo et al, 2018; Liwtin & Miłkowski, 2020). Yet another kind of critique argues that there is no significant connection between the (a priori) FEP formalism on the one hand, and the (empirical) process theories it is intended to support on the other (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), or that it presents a false equivocation between probability and adaptive value (Colombo, 2020). Other works, such as Di Paolo, Thompson, and Beer (2021) and Raja, Valluri, Baggs, Chemero, and Anderson (2021) have recently disputed claims about the FEP representing a general unifying principle, claiming that it fails to account for different sensorimotor aspects of embodied and (autopoietic) enactive cognition.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some of these problems have to do with the capacity of the framework to account for traditional folk psychological distinctions between belief and desire (see e.g., Dewhurst, 2017; Klein, 2018; Yon, Heyes, & Press, 2020), although its defenders have argued that it can account for desire in a novel way (Clark, 2020; Wilkinson, Deane, Nave, & Clark, 2019). Another, very common, kind of critique is that the framework either does not enjoy any empirical support, or that the FEP is empirically inadequate (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), and should therefore be considered to offer, at best, a redescription of existing data (see e.g., Cao, 2020; Colombo et al, 2018; Liwtin & Miłkowski, 2020). Yet another kind of critique argues that there is no significant connection between the (a priori) FEP formalism on the one hand, and the (empirical) process theories it is intended to support on the other (Colombo & Palacios, 2021; Colombo & Wright, 2021; Williams, 2021), or that it presents a false equivocation between probability and adaptive value (Colombo, 2020).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It can also be used to explain dispositions and the development of personality [172]. Agencies are deemed to restrict themselves to a limited number of (likely) sensory encounters by continuously updating their expectations about their environment, and then minimising their sensory entropy to increase the likelihood of maintaining order, with the intention of minimising surprisal events to enhance viability [173]. The average surprisal is determined by the entropy, and minimising entropy on average corresponds to the minimisation of sensory entropy, while at the same time supporting strategies for self-organisation.…”
Section: Structure-forming Stability Through Free-energymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6.3) convincingly argues that Friston invokes two distinct senses of free energy, which here correspond roughly to roles 1 and 3. Sprevak citesColombo and Wright (2018) as drawing a similar distinction Williams (2021). distinguishes descriptive and explanatory versions of the free energy principle, seemingly tracking the same issue.…”
mentioning
confidence: 96%