Is the German system of corporate governance converging towards the Anglo-American model?

Abstract

This paper analyses whether the German corporate governance is converging towards Anglo-American practices. We summarise the extant empirical evidence on the various governance mechanisms that economic theory suggests ensure efficiency and describe recent legal developments. We find no clear signs of convergence in form, i.e. the main distinctive features of the German system have remained largely unaltered. However, changes occurred over the last decade (specially in the legal framework) suggest a certain convergence in function, i.e. some governance mechanisms have effectively incorporated aims and/or goals generally associated with the Anglo-American model.

Controlling Shareholders and Payout Policy: Do Founding Families Have a Special 'Taste for Dividends'?

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“…Generally, Germany is considered to be less shareholder oriented and thus provides an interesting setting for an analysis of VBM systems (e.g. Böhmer, 2002;Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog, 2008).…”