Is the urban-rural divide affectively polarised? Comparative evidence from nine European countries

Abstract

Recent research points to a re-emergence of the urban-rural cleavage in Europe. Yet, existing work does not account for the affective mechanisms that make geographic divides relevant for politics to begin with. In this paper, we introduce the concept of place-based affect, proposing that like and dislike across the urban-rural divide provides a powerful explanation for Europe’s electoral geography, particularly for identity-based conflicts, such as the cosmopolitan-nationalist cleavage. We argue that urban place-based affect increases the likelihood to vote for cosmopolitan parties, while rural place-based affect draws voters to nationalist parties. Relying on original survey data from Germany, we show that individuals from rural places, who like their own kind, but dislike city people, are more inclined to vote for nationalist parties. In con-trast, urbanites, liking city people and disliking people from rural areas, tend to vote more cos-mopolitan.

Asymmetries in Urban, Suburban, and Rural Place-Based Resentment

“…Armstrong, Lucas, and Taylor 2022;Czaika andDi Lillo 2018, 2018;Fitzgerald 2018;Gimpel et al 2020;Rodriguez-Pose 2018;Rodden 2019). While it is possible for groups to disagree with one another without connecting their views to a deeper sense of who they are, the strength and persistence of geographic divides in contemporary politics has led researchers to suspect that they are likely rooted in important social attachments and identities (Mason 2018;Hegewald and Schraff 2022;Cramer 2016). A number of recent studies have shown that many people do identify strongly with their local communities, and that these place identities structure their political attitudes and preferences (e.g.…”

“…Recent elections in Canada, the United States, and Europe have been characterized by dramatic urban-rural electoral divides (Armstrong, Lucas, and Taylor 2022;Rodriguez-Pose 2018;Rodden 2019). One important source of this divide, according to recent research, is a strong sense of personal identification with place -or "place-based identity" -among voters, especially among voters in rural or peripheral places (Cramer 2016;de Lange, Brug, and Harteveld 2022;Hegewald and Schraff 2022;Trujillo and Crowley 2022;Wuthnow 2019). As pioneering ethnographic research by Katherine Cramer (2016) in Wisconsin first observed, rural place identity appears to be underpinned not only by citizens' feelings of in-group attachment to their own communities, but also, even more significantly, by out-group hostility toward places that they perceive to enjoy undeserved benefits that are not available to their own communities.…”

Asymmetries in urban, suburban, and rural place-based resentment

“…Recent elections in Canada, the United States, and Europe have been characterized by dramatic urban-rural electoral divides (Armstrong, Lucas, and Taylor 2022;Rodriguez-Pose 2018;Rodden 2019). One important source of this divide, according to recent research, is a strong sense of personal identification with place -or "place-based identity" -among voters, especially among voters in rural or peripheral places (Cramer 2016;de Lange, Brug, and Harteveld 2022;Hegewald and Schraff 2022;Trujillo and Crowley 2022;Wuthnow 2019). As pioneering ethnographic research by Katherine Cramer (2016) in Wisconsin first observed, rural place identity appears to be underpinned not only by citizens' feelings of in-group attachment to their own communities, but also, even more significantly, by out-group hostility toward places that they perceive to enjoy undeserved benefits that are not available to their own communities.…”

It Takes a Village: Economic Decay, Rootedness, and Voting

“…L. Hochschild 1981). Place attachment also appears to benefit the far-right (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011;Hegewald and Schraff 2022), namely by amplifying the impact of external shocks (Ziblatt, Hilbig, and Bischof 2020). Historical antagonism against most central and booming areas is thought to fuel resentment in peripheral and low-status ones and drive the shift towards the right.…”

“…A first research area observes that social capital favors the far-right, namely by amplifying the social impact of economic decline (Bolet 2021;Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011;Colombo and Dinas 2023;Rodríguez-Pose, Lee, and Lipp 2021). A second area finds that regions featuring strong place attachment are also more prone to voting for these parties, again especially in times of crisis (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011;Hegewald and Schraff 2022;Ziblatt, Hilbig, and Bischof 2020). Thirdly, ethnographic evidence, notably from the American context, has emphasized the role of place-based community rootedness (Cramer 2016;A.…”