Abstract:The central question in political philosophy is whether political states have the right to coerce their constituents and whether citizens have a moral duty to obey the commands of their state. In this 2005 book, Christopher Heath Wellman and A. John Simmons defend opposing answers to this question. Wellman bases his argument on samaritan obligations to perform easy rescues, arguing that each of us has a moral duty to obey the law as his or her fair share of the communal samaritan chore of rescuing our compatri… Show more
“…Thus, Associative theories are hung on the horns of a dilemma. They must either make claims that are counterintuitive and indefensible, or (once their claims are rendered plausible) they must collapse into some kind of non‐Associative theory (Wellman and Simmons, , p. 111).While we reject such a view, we think that there is a case to answer and that it may help, not only in forestalling such objections but also in understanding the associative theory better, to articulate more precisely how it differs from other theories of political obligation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 73%
“…Thus, Associative theories are hung on the horns of a dilemma. They must either make claims that are counterintuitive and indefensible, or (once their claims are rendered plausible) they must collapse into some kind of non‐Associative theory (Wellman and Simmons, , p. 111).…”
Associative theorists of political obligation argue that individuals are bound to the political society of which they are members and that membership itself is the primary ground of political obligation. Some critics claim that this argument fails in large part because any plausible associative account collapses into some non‐associative theory of political obligation. This article rejects such claims, arguing that associativism is in fact a distinctive approach to political obligation. Specifically, it holds that the normative force of associativism is irreducible to either the voluntarism of consent or the universalism of natural duty theories of political obligation. Although there may be some similarities between associative accounts and these alternative theories, there are also important differences that mean the associative account cannot be assimilated without significant remainder to non‐associative theories. Hence, associative accounts offer a genuinely distinctive approach to political obligation. However, whether they offer a better approach is not a question that this article addresses.
“…Thus, Associative theories are hung on the horns of a dilemma. They must either make claims that are counterintuitive and indefensible, or (once their claims are rendered plausible) they must collapse into some kind of non‐Associative theory (Wellman and Simmons, , p. 111).While we reject such a view, we think that there is a case to answer and that it may help, not only in forestalling such objections but also in understanding the associative theory better, to articulate more precisely how it differs from other theories of political obligation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 73%
“…Thus, Associative theories are hung on the horns of a dilemma. They must either make claims that are counterintuitive and indefensible, or (once their claims are rendered plausible) they must collapse into some kind of non‐Associative theory (Wellman and Simmons, , p. 111).…”
Associative theorists of political obligation argue that individuals are bound to the political society of which they are members and that membership itself is the primary ground of political obligation. Some critics claim that this argument fails in large part because any plausible associative account collapses into some non‐associative theory of political obligation. This article rejects such claims, arguing that associativism is in fact a distinctive approach to political obligation. Specifically, it holds that the normative force of associativism is irreducible to either the voluntarism of consent or the universalism of natural duty theories of political obligation. Although there may be some similarities between associative accounts and these alternative theories, there are also important differences that mean the associative account cannot be assimilated without significant remainder to non‐associative theories. Hence, associative accounts offer a genuinely distinctive approach to political obligation. However, whether they offer a better approach is not a question that this article addresses.
“…A long-standing issue in political theory is whether there is-in the words of Simmons (in Wellman & Simmons, 2005 : 93-94)-an "external, neutral moral duty (or obligation) to discharge the internal duties imposed by law." While people may obey laws proscribing burglary, armed robbery and shoplifting because they believe each of these acts is immoral, the more diffi cult question is whether there is ever a justifi ed contentfree duty to obey the law.…”
The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation has been sponsored by the Department of Psychology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln since 1953. Each year the Symposium invites leading scholars from around the world on a topic of current interest in psychology for a conference at the University followed by publication of an edited volume. 2012 2-year Impact Factor: .571 2012 5-year Impact Factor: 1.581More information about this series at
“…Where we fail to do so, we contribute instead to what Estlund has called (in the same spirit as Shapiro and Christiano) “the tyranny of non‐consent” (Estlund ). In a similar vein, Kit Wellman tries to deal with the particularity problem by emphasizing the territorial nature of the social problem to which political authority is the unique solution: “Political instability is a coordination problem that must be solved territorially.” And because the relevant territories have distinct populations, “there is something about those in the relevant territory that singles them out as special” (Wellman and Simmons , 39). While Wellman's version of state of nature theory (like Estlund's) actually looks more Hobbesian than Kantian—and while the moral principle appealed to establish the obligation to accept political authority is one of obligatory “samaritanism” rather than a duty of justice or of “normative consent”—the boundary problem presents itself to his account (at its “second‐stage”) in the same way that it does for Kantian political philosophy .…”
Theories of political authority divide naturally into those that locate the source of states' authority in the history of states' interactions with their subjects and those that locate it in structural (or functional) features of states (such as the justice of their basic institutions). This paper argues that purely structuralist theories of political authority (such as those defended by Kant, Rawls, and contemporary "democratic Kantians") must fail because of their inability to solve the boundary problem-namely, the problem of locating the boundaries between different states' domains of authority in the natural or intuitive places.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
