Is There Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation

Abstract

Key mediation attributes, such as mediating actors, the strategy they choose, and previous mediation experiences, are widely thought to influence the nature of a conflict management outcome. But how and when these features shape outcomes is not a straightforward matter, and a standard analysis of these factors does not lead to their widely anticipated results. Why? We develop a new analytical framework that argues that a dispute's intensity alters the conflict management processes. Furthermore, in order to observe this variation, we also need to expand the traditional, dichotomous notion of conflict management outcomes (success or failure) to include a fuller range of observed results. Using the most recent International Conflict Management data set and our new analytical framework, we analyze the effect on conflict management outcome of mediator (a) identity, (b) strategy and (c) history. We find that directive strategies and international mediators are effective in resolving high intensity conflicts, procedural strategies and regional mediators are effective in resolving low intensity conflicts, and that mediation history always affects resolution. Our results have implications for both the study and practice of international dispute mediation.

Will we see helping hands? Predicting civil war mediation and likely success

“…On the other hand, research modeling selection into and the outcome of mediation shows that although increased intensity and duration increase the likelihood of mediation, the resulting increase in complexity in a peace process can decrease the probability of a settlement (Svensson, 2007). Another body of work focusing on conflict management history has demonstrated how previous mediation attempts (in particular a history of successful outcomes) help bring about future mediation (see Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006;Regan and Greig, 2008). Moreover, conflicts in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to see mediation and more amenable to settlement (Regan and Greig, 2008).…”

“…Leaving aside the issue of whether such assessments of personal characteristics of a mediator may be exaggerated or classified based on the outcomes they purportedly explain, the specific issues done by a mediator during the course of a conflict and its likely consequences will be very difficult to forecast. The material capabilities of an intermediary, and the form of mediation that they adopt, can have a strong bearing on likelihood of settlement (Beardsley et al 2006;Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). Greater economic and military resources afford an intermediary the opportunity to adopt more active forms of mediation, using inducements that can compel a stronger actor to accept peace, or reassure a weaker party that their opponent will not renege on an agreement.…”

“…As such, we expect more severe conflicts involving relatively strong rebels to be more likely to see mediation and an agreement resulting from mediation (Clayton, 2013;Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). Moreover, previous conflict management has been shown to shape the likelihood of subsequent mediation attempts and their prospects of success, once the initial costs and hurdles such as rebel recognition have been overcome (see Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006). Finally, we examine whether ex ante observable information about the conflicting dyads characteristics and the conflict history can notably improve our ability to anticipate mediation efforts and when these succeed in managing violent conflict.…”

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

“…Mediation is an extension of negotiation in which decision-making power remains with the disputants, but some aspects of the dialogue are controlled by a third-party (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). It incorporates a diverse collection of conflict management efforts, ranging from loosely facilitated bilateral negotiations (e.g.…”

“…competent means to terminate violence (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006;Beardsley et al 2006). The incumbent is only then likely to endure the costs of dialogue when a rebel group proves capable of presenting a significant challenge to state authority (Clayton 2013;Grieg and Regan 2008;Melin and Svensson 2009).…”