Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm, Stephen R.

doi:10.1093/bjps/axl015

Cited by 288 publications

(217 citation statements)

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“…According to explanationists, understanding is in essence knowledge of correct explanations (Hempel 1965;Salmon 1984;Khalifa 2012Khalifa , 2013. Manipulationists, on the other hand, claim that understanding is essentially a specific kind of ability, roughly, an ability to perform (certain kinds of) manipulations of (certain kinds of) representations of the phenomena understood (de Regt and Dieks 2005;de Regt 2009a, b;Grimm 2006Grimm , 2014Wilkenfeld 2013. 4 In a recent paper (Kelp 2015), I argue that both types of accounts remain ultimately unsatisfactory and propose a better alternative.…”

Section: Understanding: the True Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inquiry, knowledge and understanding

Kelp

2018

Synthese

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Section: Understanding: the True Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inquiry, knowledge and understanding

Kelp

2018

Synthese

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“…'. 4 Answers to why-questions are typically said to be specific complex propositions of the form (X is the case because of Y) or (p because q), for some q (see, e.g., Grimm 2006Grimm , 2014Pritchard 2008Pritchard , 2014Kelp 2014;Sliwa 2015;Riaz 2015;Hills 2016). Take…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Stephen Grimm (2006Grimm ( , 2014, Christoph Kelp (2014), andPaulina Sliwa (2015) argue that coming to believe that (p because q) also requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. If they were right, Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) would fail, according to his own criteria.…”

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Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements

Lawler

2018

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because q), for some q. 2 Such knowledge can be also acquired via testimony. Thus, (K-WHY ≠ CAS).Pritchard's argument for (U-WHY = CAS) is based on two assumptions: (i) Having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a necessary requirement for understanding-why. (ii) Having (p because q) information is not equivalent to having such an explanatory story. He then argues that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a kind of CAS and that therefore (U-WHY = CAS).These arguments can be questioned in at least two different ways. Stephen Grimm (2006Grimm ( , 2014, Christoph Kelp (2014), andPaulina Sliwa (2015) argue that coming to believe that (p because q) also requires having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related. If they were right, Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) would fail, according to his own criteria. If having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is a kind of CAS, then (K-WHY = CAS) and (U-WHY = CAS). Grimm (2012), Daniel Whiting (2012), and J. Adam Carter and Emma Gordon (2014) argue that having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is not a kind of CAS. If so, Pritchard's argument for (U-WHY = CAS) would fail. Then, it seems that (K-WHY ≠ CAS) and (U-WHY ≠ CAS). Either way, being a kind of CAS would not be a feature that sets understanding-why apart from knowledge-why. So, the crucial questions are: Does acquiring (p because q) information require having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related? Is having an explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related a kind of CAS?In this paper, I argue that both questions should be answered in the negative. After introducing the concept of a CAS (section 2) and after presenting Pritchard's argument for (K-WHY ≠ CAS) in more detail (section 3), I first elaborate on the explanatory story requirement (section 4). Having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related is to have information about facts or principles that establish the causal connections between the phenomena in question. Then, I make a positive case for the claim that coming to believe that (p because q), for some q, does not 2 I use round brackets to avoid scope ambiguities with respects to 'know'. 3/33require having a sound explanatory story regarding how cause and effect are related, and I rebut

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“…Este proceso de validación es una construcción social, se trata de un conjunto de mensajes e informaciones "consensuadas" por la comunidad, no reflejan un conocimiento transparente y verdadero de lo real sino un proceso de acuerdo inestable (GRIMM, 2006). Complementariamente, otra parte de conocimiento (tácita) no es acumulable en el libro de códigos pero es una dimensión clave y dinámica para producir nuevos mensajes y para interpretar los existentes.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Comunicación y Transferencia en las Innovaciones Sociales. Codificación y Comunidades de Conocimiento

Satrústegui

2014

Hist. Comun. Soc.

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Resumen:Las innovaciones sociales requieren incorporar conocimiento externo a sus prácticas y reutilizar el conocimiento producido en las diferentes prácticas que la propia innovación requiere. Para que este proceso de comunicación y transferencia suceda no es suficiente con disponer de un saber hacer (dimensión tácita) sino que es preciso codificar niveles de conocimiento (dimensión explícita). Así, la articulación de conocimiento en una comunidad innovadora es un proceso de codificación de conocimientos dispersos, articulando o asimilando sistemas de codificación.Palabras Clave: innovación social; comunicación; transferencia; conocimiento; codificación. Communication and Social Innovation Transfer.Codification and Knowledge Communities Abstract Successful social innovations require the incorporation of external knowledge as well as the transformation of the knowledge produced during the development of the innovations themselves. In order for this process of communication and transference to be properly conducted it is not sufficient to have the know-how (tacit dimension) but it also necessary to encode different levels of knowledge (explicit dimension). Thus the knowledge management in an innovative community is a process of encoding scattered knowledge, either articulating or assimilating coding systems.

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Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Cited by 288 publications

References 14 publications

Inquiry, knowledge and understanding

Inquiry, knowledge and understanding

Understanding why, knowing why, and cognitive achievements

Comunicación y Transferencia en las Innovaciones Sociales. Codificación y Comunidades de Conocimiento

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