Islamic headscarves and the CJEU

Abstract

This article contains an analysis of the recent CJEU cases on the wearing of

EU anti-discrimination law

“…80 There were different views of whether there was direct or indirect discrimination in this case, not only between the Advocate Generals but also between the parties themselves, the Member States involved and between academic commentators. 81 The question is important because, as was mentioned, direct discrimination cannot be justified, but indirect discrimination can. But, even if indirect discrimination is found rather than direct discrimination, the strictness of the application of the justification test can influence the outcome of the case.…”

“…Brems 85 sees the acceptance of the expansion of neutrality to the private sphere without the least degree of scrutiny as problematic and points out that 'neutrality can be an easy cover-up for prejudice'. 86 Second, there is criticism of the way in which the CJEU applies the proportionality and necessity test. 87 The CJEU does not appear to apply a very strict proportionality test and does not balance the needs of the employer with the disadvantage imposed on the individual employee or with that employee's right to manifest their religion guaranteed by Article 10 EUCFR.…”

“…Kokott did not bring forward or refer to any evidence for this. 91 Loenen 92 points out that the condition that a neutrality policy needs to be limited to workers who interact with customers 'still leaves a very large group of workers exposed to the negative effects of a ban on religious clothing or symbols'. And, according to Bell, 93 'it would surely be firmly rejected if an employer sought to place other groups vulnerable to discrimination in job roles that avoided contact with customers'.…”

“…97 The third major point of criticism is the uncertainty about the level of discretion left to the Member States to decide how to regulate the wearing of religious symbols in employment. 98 Before the judgments and the opinions came out, Loenen and Vickers 99 discussed whether the CJEU should follow a deferential approach to national practice in relation to the wearing of religious symbols in employment or whether it should not do so and concluded that powerful arguments exist for both sides. 100 Advocate General Kokott favoured giving a measure of discretion to national authorities and courts in applying the proportionality test as she considered that the CJEU does not necessarily have to prescribe a solution that is uniform throughout the EU.…”

Pour une lecture dialogique du droit international des droits humains. Remarques sur les constatations du Comité des droits de l'Homme dans l’affaire Baby Loup, et quelques réactions qu’elles ont suscitées.

“…Dans ces conditions, dès lors qu'elle est appliquée de manière « cohérente et systématique », la politique de neutralité ne saurait être analysée comme discriminatoire -fût-ce indirectement. Globalement, les commentaires académiques de ces importants arrêts ont été très négatifs -singulièrement du point de vue des concepts et de l'application du droit de la non-discrimination 41 . Ils marquent en toute hypothèse très clairement la réticence du juge européen à mobiliser vigoureusement le concept de discrimination face aux mesures et politiques qui restreignent la liberté des musulmanes de manifester au travail leur appartenance religieuse.…”