2016
DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2016.1185696
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Israel, the Arab Spring, and the unfolding regional order in the Middle East: a strategic assessment

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Cited by 14 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The power capabilities of Israel outweigh those of Iran significantly (Kaye et al, ; see also Amour, ). In some areas, such as high technology and education standards, Israel is so much more advanced than Iran that it might be indifferent to relative power changes in favour of Iran.…”
Section: Attempts To Explain the Aggravated Conflicts Of Saudi Arabiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The power capabilities of Israel outweigh those of Iran significantly (Kaye et al, ; see also Amour, ). In some areas, such as high technology and education standards, Israel is so much more advanced than Iran that it might be indifferent to relative power changes in favour of Iran.…”
Section: Attempts To Explain the Aggravated Conflicts Of Saudi Arabiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Iran-led bloc is known for its critical stance toward Israel/USA. Eruptions in the political leadership in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere have facilitated the formation of a third bloc, which I call the elected-"reformist" camp, led by Turkey and Qatar (Amour, 2017). The rise of this novel alliance has intensified uncertainty and insecurity in the regional behavior of the established alliances.…”
Section: The Regional System In the Middle Eastmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Palestinian paramilitary capabilities proved insufficient on their own to be translated into strategic ends; hence, they were not accompanied by a diplomatic reinforcement of a regional or international power that might have encouraged Israel to make concessions. Thus, in the aftermath of the Gaza Battle of 2014, Israel was not open to concessions in contrast to 2012 because of the disappearance of a regional broker (for Israel's policy during the Arab Spring movement, see Amour, 2017). Furthermore, later developments in the Middle East have placed enormous pressure on the novel allies to the strategic disadvantage of Hamas.…”
Section: Hamas's Downgrade Within the Regional Dynamics (2013-2018)mentioning
confidence: 99%