2009
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-009-0148-5
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Issuers’ incentives and tests of Baron’s model of IPO underpricing

Abstract: Initial public offering, Incentives, Underwriter, G32,

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Cited by 6 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…As underwriters and company directors are required to provide reliable information to prospective investors, they may be held legally responsible for providing false information in the prospectus if the stock is overpriced. Chen et al (2009) compare the underpricing of self-marketed underwriter IPO (investment banks that participated in the distribution of their own securities) with the non-self-marketed underwriter IPO and find that self-marketed IPO exhibit less underpricing. They argue that it is because the asymmetric information problem between the issuer and underwriter is eliminated.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As underwriters and company directors are required to provide reliable information to prospective investors, they may be held legally responsible for providing false information in the prospectus if the stock is overpriced. Chen et al (2009) compare the underpricing of self-marketed underwriter IPO (investment banks that participated in the distribution of their own securities) with the non-self-marketed underwriter IPO and find that self-marketed IPO exhibit less underpricing. They argue that it is because the asymmetric information problem between the issuer and underwriter is eliminated.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%