2016
DOI: 10.1017/mor.2015.45
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It's Not Just a Visit: Receiving Government Officials’ Visits and Firm Performance in China

Abstract: Drawing upon signaling theory, we propose that a specific form of non-market action, receiving government officials' visits, reduces transaction costs between firms and their potential exchange partners and thus contributes to firms' competitive advantage in China. We also contend that severity of information asymmetry and availability of alternative ways of reducing transaction costs moderate the relationship between receiving government officials' visits and company financial performance in opposite directio… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…Following Li et al (), we choose capital city as a dummy instrumental variable. It equals 1 if the firm headquarters are in the capital city of a province and is 0 otherwise.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Following Li et al (), we choose capital city as a dummy instrumental variable. It equals 1 if the firm headquarters are in the capital city of a province and is 0 otherwise.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike previous studies, we distinguish the strength of political access by measuring the number of official visits to firms. Official visits strengthen the interactions between executives and politicians (Li et al, ; Schuler et al, ). Managers deliberately allocate cash for philanthropic giving to forge ties with local officials; public knowledge of the official visits increases these allocations.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Wong (2010) uses firms' data from Hong Kong to show that PCFs enjoy enhanced accounting and market performance. Li et al (2016) and Wang et al (2019), using government officials' corporate site visits to measure political connections, empirically document that Chinese firms that received officials' visits obtain more new investment projects and bank loans, which could ultimately improve their performance. Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) examine the effect of political connections on performance of German firms.…”
Section: Risk Committee Political Connection and Corporate Financial Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Su and Fung (2013) argue that cultivating political connections help firms to increase their sales and to incur lower operation and financing cost, which may reflect favourably on the firms' performance. A review of literature indicates that politically connected firms (PCFs) experience high financial performance (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010;Wu et al, 2012;Ding et al, 2014;Zhang et al, 2014;Li et al, 2016;Wang et al, 2019). In line with this argument, one may expect that an RC as a channel to improve a firm performance may be diluted in the presence of political ties and, thus, the RC-performance association is weakened for PCFs.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several factors, such as inconsistent law enforcement and corruption among public officials, are considered limiting factors of the political-legal environment. Firms can improve their performance if they receive government subsidies and facilities [2], without increasing transaction costs through political support [3], we can guarantee the legal protection of your investment, and keeping abreast of global business developments [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%