Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For

Greco, Daniel

doi:10.1111/phc3.12267

Cited by 22 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…This contextualist version of safety, in which iterations of safety can follow trivially from first-order safety, fits in nicely with extant contextualist accounts of knowledge. As I argue in Greco (2014), a broadly Lewisian contextualist framework can be used to defend the KK principle-the thesis that if a subject knows that P, then she knows that she knows that P. 15 And the reasons why it can be defended in this framework are structurally very similar to the reasons why iterations of robustness and safety can come for free in the contextualist picture we've been exploring-on the view I defend in my (2014), knowing requires avoiding error in a contextually determined set of cases, but which cases those are doesn't itself systematically vary with the case, but only with the context. And as we've seen, when the set of relevant cases (whether relevant for attributions of robustness, safety, or knowledge) doesn't itself vary from case to case, but only from context to context, second-order robustness/safety/knowledge isn't more demanding than its first-order cousin.…”

Section: Iterationmentioning

confidence: 92%

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Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Greco

2016

Philosophical Issues

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This paper argues for several related theses. First, the epistemological position that knowledge requires safe belief can be motivated by views in the philosophy of science, according to which good explanations show that their explananda are robust. This motivation goes via the idea—recently defended on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that knowledge attributions play a crucial role in explaining successful action. Second, motivating the safety requirement in this way creates a choice point—depending on how we understand robustness, we'll end up with different conceptions of safety in epistemology. Lastly, and most controversially, there's an attractive choice at this point that will not vindicate some of the most influential applications of the safety‐theoretic framework in epistemology, e.g., Williamson's (2000) arguments against the KK principle, and luminosity.

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Section: Iterationmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…See Greco () for some discussion of the connection between common knowledge on the one hand, and iteration principles in epistemology on the other.…”

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confidence: 99%

Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Greco

2016

Philosophical Issues

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“…Accordingly, we are only justified in 30 A version of the JJ-principle for idealized inferential justification is defended by Fumerton (1995Fumerton ( , 2015. For discussions on iteration principles, see Greco (2014Greco ( , 2015a. 31 Here it is tacitly assumed that self-referring higher-level beliefs are not justified.…”

Section: Kk-principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

Melchior

2021

Erkenn

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This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation.

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“…The reply also threatens to undermine some of the most prominent arguments for the importance of common knowledge (Heal () (now elegantly presented by Greco ()), Clark & Marshall (), Fagin et al . (), among many others): if one attempted to save common knowledge assumptions from their paradoxical consequences by blaming the message‐passing setup, one would thereby lose some important motivations for the importance of common knowledge in the first place.…”

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confidence: 99%

Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail

Lederman¹

2017

Nous

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The coordinated attack scenario and the electronic mail game are two paradoxes of common knowledge. In simple mathematical models of these scenarios, the agents represented by the models can coordinate only if they have common knowledge that they will. As a result, the models predict that the agents will not coordinate in situations where it would be rational to coordinate. I argue that we should resolve this conflict between the models and facts about what it would be rational to do by rejecting common knowledge assumptions implicit in the models. I focus on the assumption that the agents have common knowledge that they are rational, and provide models to show that denying this assumption suffices for a resolution of the paradoxes. I describe how my resolution of the paradoxes fits into a general story about the relationship between rationality in situations involving a single agent and rationality in situations involving many agents.

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Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For

Cited by 22 publications

References 43 publications

Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Safety, Explanation, Iteration

Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement

Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail

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