Needs for security and certainty (NSC) vary in their relationship with economic preferences as a function of political engagement. Among those low in engagement, NSC is directly related to left-leaning economic preferences, since social welfare can be regarded as insurance. Among those high in engagement, NSC predicts right-wing economic preferences, since engaged individuals high in NSC take cues from right-leaning elites suggesting that support for redistribution is inconsistent with conservative ideological and partisan identities. In this study, we argue that this ‘reversal’ is less applicable to universal basic income (UBI), since the latter is an unconditional benefit that detaches welfare provision from specific situations of risk (e.g., unemployment insurance). This should shift individuals to think of provision in terms of moral hazard (e.g., work avoidance) in the context of UBI. Using Round 8 of the European Social Survey, we test and find support for several hypotheses based on this argument.