Jobs or Privileges: Unleashing the Employment Potential of the Middle East and North Africa

Politics of trade protection in an autocracy: Evidence from an EU tariff liberalization in Morocco

“…Both of these are minor concerns in our context. Firm entry and exit rates are among the lowest in the Middle East, including Morocco (Schiffbauer, Sy, Hussain, and Sahnoun, 2014). Turnover rates are likely to be even lower than the average for larger firms owned by politically connected businessmen.…”

Hard traveling: unemployment and road infrastructure in the shadow of political conflict

“…In Egypt, Springborg (2017) explains in detail how the military involves itself in every major industry, monopolizing by force or delegating production to regime cronies. As a recent World Bank report concludes, “policies that stifle competition and create an uneven playing field abound in MENA and are a major constraint on private sector growth and job creation” (Sahnoun et al , 2014). Second, these laws may be unevenly applied, in a way that creates uncertainty.…”

“…Second, these laws may be unevenly applied, in a way that creates uncertainty. Indeed, the World Bank has found that firms in Egypt, Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan, report uncertainty over the discriminatory and politically motivated application of industrial policy as a “severe” or “major” obstacle to growth (Sahnoun et al , 2014). Finally, the prospect of civil war, foreign invasion, uprisings, and other forms of political upheaval discourage investment.…”

“…Aside from the most obvious political causes of economic disaster, such as civil war (Yemen, Syria), state failure (Libya), or military blockade (Gaza, see Etkes and Zimring, 2015), this literature sees the political origins of unemployment even in more stable parts of the region. Limited access orders, such as Morocco, Algeria, pre-revolutionary Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and all of the Gulf states, purchase political stability through a mixture of repression and co-option, where the latter often involves anti-competitive laws and practices that benefit cronies of the regime at the expense of competitive dynamism (Sahnoun et al, 2014;Cammett et al, 2015). Indeed, recent micro-empirical studies have provided evidence of crony capitalism's market-distorting effects in pre-revolutionary Tunisia (Rijkers et al, 2017), Egypt (Diwan et al, 2014), and Lebanon (Diwan and Haidar, 2020).…”

Are Politically Connected Firms Turtles or Gazelles? Evidence from the Egyptian Uprising

“…Are politically connected firms, turtles, or gazelles? Sahnoun et al (2014) reports that gazelle firms mainly generate employment opportunities in the MENA region. In this study, we focus on politically connected firms and whether or not they contribute to employment growth in Egypt.…”