Joint Pricing and Product Carbon Footprint Decisions and Coordination of Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cheng, Yonghong; Xiong, Zhongkai; Luo, Qinglin

doi:10.3390/su10020481

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Conversely, if (1 − ( )) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) < 0 , the manufacturer can sell the surplus of the emission permits. Note that the above way to express the cost/revenue from the trade of the emission permits is commonly used in the literature [47][48][49]. In the following discussions, we assume − ( + ) − 1 > 0 to ensure that the demand is positive.…”

Section: Complexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low‐Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

et al. 2019

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The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.

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Section: Complexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low‐Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

et al. 2019

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“…e implementation of cap-and-trade policy is crucial for supply chains to make operation decisions [6]. Existing research tends to be fragmented on carbon trade in the supply chain management.…”

Section: Supply Chain Management Under Carbon Cap-and-tradementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Jiang et al [10] and Yuan et al [14] set up a supply chain system with carbon trade to examine the problem of carbon information asymmetry. Cheng et al [6] and Xu et al [15] did research on the impacts of carbon cap-and-trade policy on supply chain systems under the centralized and decentralized operation modes. Pang et al [16] and Wang et al [17] introduced consumer environmental awareness into the study of supply chains with carbon trade.…”

Section: Supply Chain Management Under Carbon Cap-and-tradementioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of an Environmentally Responsible Supply Chain with Cost Disturbance under Carbon Price Fluctuations

Huang

2020

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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This paper studies a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer under carbon emission reduction target and carbon cap-and-trade policy. The unit production cost varies when carbon price fluctuates. We find that carbon price fluctuations affect the original optimal production decision in the supply chain. We also compare how this disturbance affects the supply chain operations under three different power structures with a focus on the profitability and robustness.

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“…Much research on carbon emissions constraints, carbon tax, and carbon cap-and-trade has addressed carbon reduction, pricing strategies, sustainable supply chains, corporate profits, and social welfare (Yang et al, [1,2,13,[25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32]. To illustrate, Hovelaque and Mazahir (2015) look at the economic order quantity (EOQ) model with carbon constraints and ensure that enterprises can achieve a win-win outcome with regard to profits and carbon emissions [2].…”

Section: Low Carbonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trade-Old-for-Remanufactured Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Carbon Tax and Government Subsidies

et al. 2018

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The constantly increasing CO2 emissions are threatening the environment tremendously. Facing the pressure of environmental activists and public opinion, businesses and governments are taking action to reduce carbon emissions. Among these endeavors, carbon tax and subsidy policies proposed by governments are widely adopted. Remanufacturing is believed to save manufacturing costs and reduce carbon emissions from the process of enterprise operation, and it is increasingly being accepted by enterprises. However, different consumers’ willingness to pay for remanufactured products and the durability of new products will also affect consumers’ willingness to buy remanufactured products. Therefore, considering the discrepancy between consumer willingness to pay and product durability, we established the trade-old-for-remanufactured (TOR) model for a scenario of carbon tax and government subsidies. Through the analysis of the model, we obtained the optimal pricing and production decisions of manufacturers (remanufacturers) in the case of carbon tax and government subsidies. Our results show that, when there is no carbon tax constraint, the increase in consumer willingness to pay and the adjustment in product durability can stimulate consumers to participate in TOR projects and augment enterprises’ profits. However, it can also lead to a carbon rebound that increases corporate carbon emissions. When there is a carbon tax constraint, the introduction of carbon tax contributes to a reduction in carbon emissions, while enterprises tend to lose profits. In order to achieve a “win-win” between corporate profits and carbon emissions, we considered government subsidy policies. Our numerical examples illustrate that appropriate carbon tax and government subsidies can curb carbon emissions and also increase profits for enterprises.

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Joint Pricing and Product Carbon Footprint Decisions and Coordination of Supply Chain with Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cited by 9 publications

References 33 publications

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low‐Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Myopic versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low‐Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

Coordination of an Environmentally Responsible Supply Chain with Cost Disturbance under Carbon Price Fluctuations

Trade-Old-for-Remanufactured Closed-Loop Supply Chains with Carbon Tax and Government Subsidies

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