Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

Tridmas, George

doi:10.1007/s10602-005-5850-2

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…The dataset for cross-sectional empirical investigation encompasses 42 economies between the years 2001 and 2004. Third, Tridimas (2005) shows theoretically and empirically that a stronger judicial review and judicial independence are associated with a relatively lower size of government. The latter is measured by central government revenue to GDP.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 93%

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Kantorowicz

2014

Danube

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The judicialization of politics, or alternatively, politization of the judiciary has been much discussed over the last twenty years. Despite this, the way judges influence fiscal policy outcomes remains, to a large extent, unexplored. This paper attempts, at least partially, to fill this research gap. A judicial (constitutional) review constitutes the central element of the current analysis since it is considered as a key institutional device through which Constitutional (Supreme) Courts intervene in politics, including public finance. Specifically, this paper seeks to investigate empirically whether there is any systematic pattern according to which judges executing judicial review shape fiscal outcomes. The conceptual framework is based on the strategic interaction model and the assumption that the Constitutional Courts reflect public opinion (i.e. the Court as a majoritarian institution). Some preliminary results for a panel of 24 EU countries in the period 1995-2005 suggest that a strong judicial review correlates with a smaller size of government, measured as government income to GDP.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 93%

Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?

Kantorowicz

2014

Danube

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“…However, lacking equal powers with the House of Commons, the Lords falls short of formal veto player status, and so is unlikely to generate the sort of constraints on government -particularly in relation to budgetary measures -characteristic of powerful second chambers (Heller, 2001;Bradbury and Crain, 2006). Systems of strong judicial review are also believed to restrain governments' ability to introduce redistributory fiscal measures (Tridimas, 2005). Yet, such effects are again unlikely in Britain since, although judicial decisions appear to be honoured by ministers, there are few grounds under the Human Rights Act for 11 individuals or groups to challenge government decisions on raising and disbursing public goods.…”

Section: Analysing Constitutional Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysing constitutional reform in Britain: Insights from economic approaches

Seyd¹

2013

Br Polit

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Over the last decade, the British state has been profoundly restructured. The reforms challenge scholars to develop accounts that can provide a unified analysis of the numerous changes and enable their effects to be identified. While the constitutional changes in Britain are the subject of an extensive literature, most of the studies focus on individual institutions and neglect the reforms' collective nature and effects. To develop a more unified analysis of the reforms and their consequences, we need an account of what institutions are and of how they work. Economic analyses of institutions provide such an account, helping us to identify the common operating logics that underpin different institutions along with their effects. Insights from economic analyses are used to examine the recent institutional reforms in Britain, in particular how these reforms affect the distribution of decision making authority and the nature of political accountability.

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“…provides a survey of some of this literature. For examples of observed constraints, see alsoAcemoglu (2005),Acemoglu and Robinson (2005),Djankov et al (2003),Greif (2005Greif ( , 2008,North and Weingast (1989), andWeingast (2005).6 See, for example, Glaeser and Shleifer(2002), LaPorta et al (2004), andTridimas (2005). For reviews of this literature and its extensions to other fields, seeBeck et al (2001),Djankov et al (2003) andFergusson (2006).…”

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confidence: 99%