Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

Willison, David

doi:10.1177/1532673x8601400403

American Politics Quarterly

1986

DOI: 10.1177/1532673x8601400403

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Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

David Willison

Abstract: Scholars focusing on court-agency relationships at the federal level have generally neglected the role played by the courts of appeals. Exploring agency cases coming before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984), this analysis reveals fairly strong support for the positions of federal agencies taken as a whole. Considerable variance, however, exists across both individual judges and specific agencies. Although much of the variance remains unaccounted for, the political envir… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

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At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

Caruson

Bitzer

2004

Law & Policy

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This study seeks to expand our understanding of judicial deference to administrative agencies within the context of one particularly important legal forumthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The DC circuit functions as a key venue for administrative law cases and the opinions of the court constitute a growing body of common law in the field of administrative law. We investigate the importance of several agency-centered and judge-centered variables in explaining judicial deference to administrative agencies in cases before the DC circuit court during a twelve-year period (1985)(1986)(1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996). We find that an integrated model of judicial deference, combining both legal and attitudinal factors, best explains judicial deference. Like judges on so many other courts, judges on the DC circuit are politically motivated, but their political activism is tempered by agency-centered factors such as the type of case before the court, and environmental factors such as the composition of the judicial panel reviewing the case and the behavior of the Supreme Court.

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At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

Caruson

Bitzer

2004

Law & Policy

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The President, the Court, and Policy Implementation

Thrower¹

2016

Pres Stud Q

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In contrast to research focused on presidential–congressional relations, this article explores the ways in which the president strategically accounts for the courts when deciding how to best influence policy implementation. I argue that as the courts become more ideologically distant from the president and thus more likely to strike down administrative actions, agencies engage in less rulemaking while the president issues more executive orders to supplement agencies' authority to act. An empirical analysis of federal macro‐level data as well as issue‐specific data on labor and environmental policy yields support for the theory's hypotheses.

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Presidential action and the Supreme Court: The case of signing statements

Thrower

2019

Journal of Theoretical Politics

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Recent attention to presidential action recognizes the legal and constitutional questions surrounding the controversial use of many of these powers. Yet, scholarly research on executive policymaking tends to ignore the role of the courts, instead focusing on presidential–congressional relations. I develop a formal theory of the president’s decision to issue a signing statement in the face of constraints from the Supreme Court. The model produces several novel predictions. First, I predict that the president is more likely to issue a signing statement when he is ideologically aligned with the Court. Second, contrary to previous literature, the president is more likely to issue a statement when his preferences are also aligned with Congress. Finally, when reviewing legislation that is constitutionally challenged, I predict that the Court is more likely to rule in favor of the president’s position when he has issued a signing statement.

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Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

Cited by 8 publications

References 13 publications

At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics, Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–1996)*

The President, the Court, and Policy Implementation

Presidential action and the Supreme Court: The case of signing statements

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