2021
DOI: 10.1086/713470
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Judicial Selection and Criminal Punishment

Abstract: This paper develops and tests a theory that in states with judicial elections, criminal justice outcomes will be more punitive than in states without elections. Leveraging a data set previously unused in the judicial politics literature, I estimate time-series regressions of state sentencing and incarceration rates over a 38-year period while distinguishing between types of judicial elections to establish support for the theory. I find that states where trial judges are reelected are generally more punitive th… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…Even today, research suggests that officials still believe punitiveness returns an electoral benefit. In highly contested electoral environments, Gunderson (2022) finds that Democratic governors outincarcerate Republican peers, and, at the local level, Taylor (2021) shows that elected state trial court judges outincarcerate trial court judges in states where they are not subject to democratic accountability. While the true size of this accountability effect may have decreased alongside punitive mood since the 1990s, we expect it is still directionally accurate.…”
Section: Electoral Choice and Prosecutorial Discretionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Even today, research suggests that officials still believe punitiveness returns an electoral benefit. In highly contested electoral environments, Gunderson (2022) finds that Democratic governors outincarcerate Republican peers, and, at the local level, Taylor (2021) shows that elected state trial court judges outincarcerate trial court judges in states where they are not subject to democratic accountability. While the true size of this accountability effect may have decreased alongside punitive mood since the 1990s, we expect it is still directionally accurate.…”
Section: Electoral Choice and Prosecutorial Discretionmentioning
confidence: 99%