Juridification Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions

Teubner, Günther

doi:10.1515/9783110921472.3

Cited by 94 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…INTERFACES BETWEEN BODIES OF REGULATION Each initiative described above assumes that regulatory goals are compatible if not singular. The comfortable consensus within what might be termed "good regulatory practice" hides a far more messy reality (see also Australian Law Reform Commission 2002;Teubner 1998), particularly at interfaces between regulatory regimes that are based on separate ideological underpinnings. It is in these areas of interface that the consensus on good regulatory practice is either irrelevant or can exacerbate problems for companies in their attempts to comply with disparate demands.…”

Section: B Optimal Regulatory Strategies In Australian Health and Samentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory Conflict

Haines

Gurney

2003

Law & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Regulatory analyses often assume that compliance is desirable, with literature focusing on strategies to encourage “excellence” in adherence to regulatory goals. Yet, it is not unusual for disparate regulatory goals to exist that are based on competing values of what constitutes the “good society.” It is this conflict that forms the substance of this paper. In cases of competing regulatory goals, techniques that encourage exemplary compliance in one area can create incentives to breach regulatory provisions of a competing regime. In such cases, generic regulatory techniques are unable to provide a useful means for resolving regulatory conflict but do allow a political delegation of conflict resolution to the “scientific” strategies of the regulator. In turn, the regulator places responsibility on companies for resolving competing regulatory demands. Successive delegation leads to juridification as well as regulators vying to retain primacy for their regime. This problem is examined through analysis of responsibilities for subcontractor safety under Australian health and safety law and sections of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 aimed at protecting competition.

show abstract

Section: B Optimal Regulatory Strategies In Australian Health and Samentioning

confidence: 99%

The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory Conflict

Haines

Gurney

2003

Law & Policy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Law alone, of course, is not always enough. Whether the law relies on carrots or sticks to induce compliance, the legal system has long been shown to suffer from significant limitations as a means of engineering social change (Teubner, 1987). Law must work in unison with other means of influence.…”

Section: The Conflicting Goals Of Srimentioning

confidence: 99%

Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals

Richardson

Cragg

2010

J Bus Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Recent scholarship has argued from a number of perspectives that attempts to control any form of activity are likely to be most successful when going with the grain of the activity to be controlled. 19 This idea ®nds formal expression in the`law of requisite variety' expressed in the form that only`variety can destroy variety'. 20 If the forms taken by systems to be controlled are varied, then the control mechanisms for these must be equally varied.…”

Section: Theories Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi‐Level Control

Scott

2002

European Law Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In its White Paper on the Governance of the European Union the European Commission has adopted a narrow concept of governance which focuses almost exclusively on public institutions exercising legislative and executive power (in other words institutions of government). The article suggests that a theory of multi‐level control in the EU would attend to greater variety both in the available governance institutions and the techniques of control. The deployment of an analysis grounded in theories of control suggests that the European Commission is substantially holding to a long‐held preference for instruments of government premised on the exercise of hierarchical power. This reform path sits uneasily with revived concerns to render the governance of the EU more democratic. Equally it inhibits the generation of more efficient governance arrangements which place greater dependence on communities, competition, and design as alternative bases of control to hierarchy. Control theory suggests that the assertion of different reform agendas and institutional structures by other actors can check the more wayward (and arguably illegitimate) tendencies within the Commission plan, whilst drawing in alternative bases of control which, when combined, may yield technically superior governance solutions.

show abstract

Juridification Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions

Cited by 94 publications

References 0 publications

The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory Conflict

The Shadows of the Law: Contemporary Approaches to Regulation and the Problem of Regulatory Conflict

Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals

The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi‐Level Control

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About