Juscorporativismo: os juízes e o judiciário na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte

Carvalho, Alexandre Douglas Zaidan de

doi:10.9732/p.0034-7191.2017v114p31

Cited by 12 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Tais resultados corroboram pesquisas anteriores que demonstraram não apenas a maior remuneração média do Judiciário, mas também que a desigualdade salarial entre os poderes não se deve apenas a razões observáveis como escolaridade e tem-po de serviço, mas também a motivos não observáveis, configurando uma espécie de prêmio salarial para servidores do Judiciário e do Legislativo quando comparados ao Executivo (Nakamura & Vaz, 2020). A existência desse prêmio deve-se às capacidades de barganha superiores possuída pelos membros desses poderes, particularmente dos magistrados, que são capazes de influenciar fortemente a agenda de políticas públicas com vistas a defender seus interesses corporativos (Carvalho & Leitão, 2013;Carvalho, 2017). Por outro lado, esta análise avança no debate sobre os supersalários no serviço público brasileiro, na medida em que realiza uma estudo longitudinal dessas remunerações, identificando em que ocupações, poderes e órgãos elas têm se concentrado ao longo do tempo.…”

Section: Um Olhar Comparativo Sobre O Emprego Público No Brasilunclassified

A elite salarial do funcionalismo público federal

Nunes

Mendes

2021

CGPC

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Este artigo tem como objetivo a identificação e análise da elite salarial do funcionalismo público federal brasileiro. Por elite salarial, o trabalho compreende as categorias com maiores salários do Estado. Primeiro, a partir de dados da Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (Rais), identificamos as ocupações mais bem remuneradas do conjunto do serviço público no ano de 2018, analisando suas características principais e em quais poderes e esferas se concentravam. Em seguida, utilizando dois critérios de corte distintos, a mediana salarial do Judiciário e o salário de ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) em 2018, verificamos também a evolução salarial da parcela com remunerações mais altas do serviço público federal nos últimos 20 anos. Em particular, focamos no estudo dos chamados supersalários, isto é, aqueles que superam a remuneração de juiz do STF. Demonstramos que, apesar de o poder mais numeroso em termos de vínculos empregatícios ser o Executivo, é o Judiciário que concentra a maior parte das ocupações da chamada elite salarial. Além disso, concluímos que, embora variável ao longo dos anos, o quantitativo dos chamados supersalários é menor do que o esperado no âmbito federal. Ainda assim, gera impacto fiscal relevante. Por fim, comparamos os achados à Proposta de Emenda Constitucional (PEC) 32/2020, fazendo sugestões para a construção de um projeto de reforma administrativa mais eficiente no combate a privilégios.

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Section: Um Olhar Comparativo Sobre O Emprego Público No Brasilunclassified

A elite salarial do funcionalismo público federal

Nunes

Mendes

2021

CGPC

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“…During the transition, the justices mobilised to protect their authority from attempts to create a new high tribunal, to entrench stronger guarantees of autonomy and independence, and to avoid the broadening of access to judicial review (Koerner and Freitas, 2013). Judges’ associations, in turn, mobilised primarily to block a proposed mechanism of judicial oversight (De Carvalho, 2017). The judiciary, in short, seemed indifferent towards the PDO in 1988.…”

Section: Legal Complex Mobilisation and Brazil’s 1988 Constitutionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Access to Justice and the Legal Complex: Building a Public Defenders’ Office in Brazil

Nunes

2020

Journal of Politics in Latin America

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Latin American democracies have developed institutions to empower citizens against the state. This article brings attention to an often overlooked, but key, actor in these processes: the legal complex. I argue that the content of reforms designed to strengthen the rule of law partially reflects the interests of politically influential collective legal actors. Political influence is defined as a function of alliances with civil society and embeddedness within decision-making arenas of the state. To develop this argument, the article analyses the slow building of Brazil’s Public Defenders’ Office (PDO). I argue that the office’s initial institutional weakness resulted from defenders’ fragile political position relative to that of prosecutors and the bar during Brazil’s constitutional transition. Its eventual strengthening sixteen years later resulted from changes to the legal complex alliance in its favour, the formation of connections between defenders and civil society, and increased PDO access to policymaking spaces.

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“…45/2004 was subject of a longstanding dispute between judges, corporations, government and the Legislative Power. The purpose of creating an entity to externally control the Judiciary was a particularly controversial subject in the discussion about the institutional structure of the Judiciary at the National Constituent Assembly (Carvalho, 2017). The voting of the chapter describing the Judiciary at the Constituent took dozens of judges to the halls of the Chamber to defend their corporate positions, mainly in the suppression of the apparatus that instituted the CNJ.…”

Section: Judicial Independence In the National Council Of Justicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Corporatism (Carvalho, 2017). This situation called attention to the fact that the adoption of the uncritical and crystallized discourse on judicial independence, when handled by the own class of judges, implied the potential increase in the risk that the high judicial bureaucracy…”

Section: Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

How are the Guards Watched Out? Institutional Limits of the Judicial Independence in Brazil and Spain

Carvalho

2018

SSRN Journal

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This paper collects data on normative design, composition, organization and performance of the Councils of Justice of Brazil and Spain, and identifies the main obstacles to the functioning of both in order to bring closer their institutional experience. The attention is focused on seeking whether the institutionalization of the Councils of Justice in the postauthoritarian constitutional experiences of these countries provides common parameters for understanding judicial practices. By following a systemic-constructivist approach that confronts judicial discourses and practices, the paper calls into question the dogma according to which judges' autonomy widens the ambit of rights. The hypothesis is that the preservation of the corporate structure and the lack of connection between independence and accountability have contributed to the dysfunctions of such bodies to the detriment of the entire Judicial Power.

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Juscorporativismo: os juízes e o judiciário na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte

Cited by 12 publications

References 6 publications

A elite salarial do funcionalismo público federal

A elite salarial do funcionalismo público federal

Access to Justice and the Legal Complex: Building a Public Defenders’ Office in Brazil

How are the Guards Watched Out? Institutional Limits of the Judicial Independence in Brazil and Spain

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