Justifying Partiality

The only ethical argument for positive δ? Partiality and pure time preference

“…6 Similarly, I believe we need take no stand on the ultimate philosophical justification for partiality. With respect to the influential tripartite taxonomy proposed by Keller (2013), I believe the position I develop to be consistent with the Projects View, the Relationship View, and the Individuals View, as well as syncretic views that combine elements of each (see Lord, 2016). Admittedly, it is sometimes unclear whether a particular philosophical justification of partiality will support the claims that I present here.…”

Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation

“…22 Philosophers disagree whether relationship-dependent reasons are grounded in the value of the relationship or the value of the other person. See, among others, Keller [2013] and Lord [2016].…”

An African perspective on the partiality and impartiality debate: Insights from Kwasi Wiredu's moral philosophy

“…15 Above, I suggested that the idea of personhood as adumbrated by Wiredu accommodates the other-centred partiality as it prioritises our loved ones (see also Ramose 2003;Bell and Metz 2011). What, however, has not been identified in the literature is that this notion appears to correspond to something like the projects view in the literature on partiality, which captures agent-centred partiality (Cottingham 1986;Lord 2016). One of the grounds for arguing for partiality in the Western moral tradition is by invoking the idea of projects, first employed by Bernard Williams (1981) in his criticism of Utilitarianism.…”

“…I have goals, relationships and activities and I ought to accord priority to these projects because they are mine, they identify me and they add meaning to my life (Cottingham 1986;Lord 2016). Without these projects, my life would be meaningless and a robust sense of a self will most probably be threatened (Keller 2013;Lord 2016).…”