Kant and ‘Ought Implies Can’

Kohl, Markus

doi:10.1093/pq/pqv044

Cited by 24 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…22 For instance, Kant explicitly limits his famous 'Ought Implies Can' (OIC) Principle to moral oughts (5:36-7). His reasoning is, roughly (for extended discussion, see my Kohl, 2015b), conditions that constrain whether the end I adopt in fact has some (however subjectively defined) value for me. 39 One might argue that prescriptions of instrumental reason are independent from questions about the value of ends given Kant's claim that for imperatives of skill 'there is no question whether the end is rational and good, but only what one must do in order to attain it' (4:415;cf.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kohl

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori, objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative‐practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non‐moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Kant explicitly limits his famous ‘Ought Implies Can’ (OIC) Principle to moral oughts (5:36‐7). His reasoning is, roughly (for extended discussion, see my Kohl, ), that only moral oughts are such that our ability to satisfy these norms depends on nothing but the internal structure of our will, i.e. on no physical contingencies.…”

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confidence: 99%

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kohl

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…However, the relationship between "is" statements and "ought" statements is more complex than this, and numerous voices suggest that descriptive and normative statements at least need to inform one another (Magnani 2007). For instance, "ought implies can" is famously ascribed to Immanuel Kant (Kohl 2015) and links descriptive properties to normative properties. What a human being can do is descriptive, and if -as any reasonable person would agree -this needs to inform what ought to be done, we have a link.…”

Section: Ethics Of and In (Eco)systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

AI Ecosystems for Human Flourishing: The Background

Stahl

2021

SpringerBriefs in Research and Innovation Governance

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This chapter analyses the concept of AI ecosystems with a view to identifying how the ecosystem metaphor can help deal with ethical questions. The first step is to introduce in more detail the concept of ecosystems, drawing specifically on the literature on innovation ecosystems. This allows the identification of characteristics of ecosystems such as their openness, the co-evolution and mutual learning of their members, and the interdependence and complex relationship between those members. These characteristics underlie the challenges that an ethics-driven approach to ecosystems must consider.

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“…27.Kohl (2015) reads ‘ought implies can’ along these lines. One may still be indirectly responsible, e.g.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant

Indregard

2018

Can. J. of Philosophy

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According to Kant each person has an empirical character, which is ultimately grounded in one’s free choice. The popular Causal Laws interpretation of empirical character holds that it consists of the causal laws governing our psychology. I argue that this reading has difficulties explaining moral change, the ‘gradual reformation’ of our empirical character: Causal laws cannot change and hence cannot be gradually reformed. I propose an alternative Causal Powers interpretation of empirical character, where our empirical character consists of our mind’s causal powers. The resulting picture of empirical character allows for moral change and Kantian weakness of will.

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Kant and ‘Ought Implies Can’

Cited by 24 publications

References 14 publications

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

AI Ecosystems for Human Flourishing: The Background

A gradual reformation: empirical character and causal powers in Kant

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