Kant and the Problem of Experience

Ginsborg, Hannah

doi:10.5840/philtopics2006341/24

Cited by 27 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…In contrast, those arguments which begin from, say, the capacity to conceptualize or to judge and move from there to the categories risk simply begging the question since Hume does not believe that we need to posit judgments in Kant's distinctive sense of the term . Here I agree with Ginsborg that readings on which the categories are necessary only for modes of experience more sophisticated than those recognized by the empiricists risk trivializing Kant's project by leaving the empiricist account of perception untouched (Ginsborg : 62). What my approach offers is a careful balance.…”

Section: An Assessment Of Kant's Positionmentioning

confidence: 55%

Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception

Golob

2011

European J of Philosophy

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This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.

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Section: An Assessment Of Kant's Positionmentioning

confidence: 55%

Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception

Golob

2011

European J of Philosophy

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“…27 The same objection, by appeal to these and related passages, is pressed against NCR by Ginsborg (2008), Griffith (2012) and Wenzel (2005).…”

Section: The Heterogeneity Of Understanding and Sensibilitymentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Against this, defenders of a conceptualist reading convincingly argue that Kant is merely entertaining a possibility that it is the task of the Deduction to show is not actual; see Ginsborg (2008: 70-1), Griffith (2012: 7-8), Grüne (2011: 474ff. ), McDowell (2007McDowell ( , 2009.…”

Section: The Heterogeneity Of Understanding and Sensibilitymentioning

confidence: 96%

“…For critical discussion see Bowman (2011), Ginsborg (2008) and Grüne (2011). 25 However, there is strong evidence for this claim in the A-Deduction as well.…”

Section: The Heterogeneity Of Understanding and Sensibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The general strategy is also pursued by Longuenesse (1998: 35-58, 211-42), Ginsborg (2006Ginsborg ( , 2008 and Grüne (2009: 193-250), but in ways that differ significantly from the one proposed here. Discussing these differences or defending my own version of this strategy would require more space than I have here.…”

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confidence: 90%

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Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction

Land¹

2015

Kantian rev.

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I give an argument against nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s First Critique, according to which one can enjoy a Kantian intuition without possessing any concepts, and present an alternative reading. The argument is that nonconceptualist readings are forced to construe the Transcendental Deduction in one of three ways, none of which is acceptable: The Deduction is seen either (i) as inconsistent with the Transcendental Aesthetic; or (ii) as addressing a question of fact rather than a question of legitimacy; or (iii) as articulating a position that Kant himself criticizes as a form of scepticism. Consideration of the third alternative, in particular, shows that a more promising construal of the Deduction must be based on a different interpretation of Kant’s claim that intuitions and concepts constitute two distinct kinds of representation than is assumed by proponents of nonconceptualist readings. I present such an interpretation and outline the alternative reading of the Deduction that results.

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Synthesis and the Forms of Judgment in Perception

Abele

2021

The Self-Conscious, Thinking Subject

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Kant and the Problem of Experience

Cited by 27 publications

References 17 publications

Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception

Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception

Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction

Synthesis and the Forms of Judgment in Perception

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