Kant and the scope of analogy in the life sciences

Berg, Hein van den

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.07.007

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…If we survey the works of Blumenbach and Johann Christian Reil (1759–1813), we see that the life sciences were not always treated axiomatically in the latter half of the eighteenth century (on Blumenbach and Reil, see Richards 2000 , 2002 , Chaps. 5 and 7; on Blumenbach see van den Berg 2018 ). However, the ideal of an axiomatic science of life did not disappear.…”

Section: Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s Axiomatic Embryologymentioning

confidence: 98%

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Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science

Berg

Demarest

2020

J Hist Biol

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Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science.

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Section: Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s Axiomatic Embryologymentioning

confidence: 98%

“…For example, in Buffon’s Histoire naturelle ( 1749 –1804), we find many inductive and analogical arguments, and it is difficult to find any demonstration from first principles (on analogy in Buffon, see Reil 2005 , pp. 55–56; van den Berg 2018 , pp. 70–71).…”

Section: Debates On the Ideal Of Axiomatic Science In Eighteenth-centmentioning

confidence: 99%

Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science

Berg

Demarest

2020

J Hist Biol

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“…Although Kant’s comments on analogy display ambivalence about its value as a form of reasoning, 5 a relatively coherent account of the concept can be found across Kant’s writings (Callanan, 2008), one that in large part reflects similar uses of the term in the natural philosophy of the 18th century and a tradition of philosophical speculation on living beings whose origins are identified in the work of Aristotle (Lloyd, 1966; Van Den Berg, 2018). It is against a certain common usage of the concept, however, that Kant defines analogy in its specificity.…”

Section: A Proportion Of Concepts: Kant’s Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6. Analogical reasoning and teleological judgment are closely related. See Breitenbach (2014), Van Den Berg (2018: 67–76), and Bennington (2017). …”

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confidence: 99%

Kant’s domestic analogy: international and global order

Burles

2022

European Journal of International Relations

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The domestic analogy is an old but persistent problem in theories of international politics. This paper examines the problem in the work of Immanuel Kant, whose political writings are often cited as a paradigmatic example of the analogy between individuals and states. Attention to Kant’s own conception of analogy, however, shows that the political writings are structured by another “domestic analogy”—between international and cosmopolitan right. This analogy, I argue, is based on a correspondence between the systematic unity of the international and the spherical globe, the figure that for Kant represents the boundaries of world order. International and cosmopolitan right are thus distinguished on the basis of a geopolitical criterion: the global scope of international order. This analogy of order, the paper argues, thus works to domesticate world politics through the structural form of international order. To the extent that contemporary theories of international relations rely on this conception of order, they accept Kant’s answer to the problem of perpetual peace. The paper concludes by drawing broader conclusions from the analysis about the domestic analogy, international order, and world politics.

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“…Moreover, Buffon’s stress on analogies points once again to the fact that he valued unified explanations. According to Buffon, as shown in van den Berg ( 2018b ), it is through discovering analogies between different phenomena, which lead us to provide a similar explanation for these phenomena, that we are able to provide unified explanations of these phenomena. Analogy is a means that allows us to discover general causes of different effects (Buffon 1785a , p. 28).…”

Section: Buffon’s Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition

Berg

2020

HPLS

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Within eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition we can distinguish at least three main theoretical positions: (i) Buffon’s mechanism, (ii) Reimarus’ theory of instincts, and (iii) the sensationalism of Condillac and Leroy. In this paper, I adopt a philosophical perspective on this debate and argue that in order to fully understand the justification Buffon, Reimarus, Condillac, and Leroy gave for their respective theories, we must pay special attention to the theoretical virtues these naturalists alluded to while justifying their position. These theoretical virtues have received little to no attention in the literature on eighteenth-century animal cognition, but figure prominently in the justification of the mechanist, instinctive, and sensationalist theories of animal behavior. Through my philosophical study of the role of theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition, we obtain a deeper understanding of how theoretical virtues were conceptualized in eighteenth-century science and how they influenced the justification of theories of animal cognition.

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Kant and the scope of analogy in the life sciences

Abstract: Kant and the Scope of Analogy in the Life Sciences Hein van den Berg (University of Amsterdam).

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science

Axiomatic Natural Philosophy and the Emergence of Biology as a Science

Kant’s domestic analogy: international and global order

Theoretical virtues in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition

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