Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative

Kohl, Markus

doi:10.1086/678370

Cited by 6 publications

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“…48 Frierson, 2003, p. 51, also accepts that the 'psychological,' compatibilist concept of free will suffices for prudential agency. I construct a detailed argument for why agency under objective norms of morality does, whereas agency under subjective desire-based norms does not, presuppose transcendental freedom of will (and hence the falsity of universal determinism) in Kohl, 2015a. 49 See Kolodny, 2005 It is not clear that this provides an argument against Humeans who seek to reduce all practical reason to instrumental reason, for they might happily endorse what Kant regards as conclusive shortcomings of instrumental reason (merely subjective validity, lack of certainty, dependence on fickle empirical conditions, etc.).…”

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“…Frierson, , p. 51, also accepts that the ‘psychological,’ compatibilist concept of free will suffices for prudential agency. I construct a detailed argument for why agency under objective norms of morality does, whereas agency under subjective desire‐based norms does not, presuppose transcendental freedom of will (and hence the falsity of universal determinism) in Kohl, .…”

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Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kohl

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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I argue against the prevalent view that in addition to the categorical imperative of morality, Kant accepts a further law of practical reason, ‘the’ Hypothetical Imperative. Kant rejects the idea that instrumental reason can be a source of a priori, objectively necessary normative requirements. His critique of instrumental reason is a central component of his argument for the supreme rational authority of morality: only moral reason can provide genuine, objective normative‐practical necessities. There are no objective practical necessities in our pursuit of empirical ends and desires. Hence, non‐moral agency is a rationally impoverished form of agency.

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Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kohl

2018

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…His claim that ‘ought has no meaning when one has only the course of nature in view’ is nevertheless true if restricted to ought s governing the exercise of free, rational faculties. I cannot examine here why Kant makes this claim; but see Kohl 2015a.…”

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Kant’s Standpoint Distinction

Kohl

2018

Kantian rev.

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I examine what Kant means when he appeals to different standpoints. I argue that Kant seeks to contrast an empirical, anthropocentric standpoint with a normative, more than human standpoint. Against common interpretations, I argue that the normative standpoint is not confined to practical reason, since theoretical reason is concerned with what ought to be as well. Finally, I defend the coherence of Kant’s distinction against important objections.

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“…Por ello, "es más factible sostener que no hay leyes prácticas sino solo consejos [Anratungen]" (V: 26). Aquí nos encontramos otra vez con la incompatibilidad entre el determinismo y la libertad, esencial para la metafísica moral de Kant (Kohl, 2015). En la KrV, Kant declara que "el deber [Sollen] no tiene significado alguno si se atiende meramente el curso de la naturaleza" (A547/B575).…”

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El problema antropológico-práctico de la felicidad en la filosofía moral de Kant

Fernández

2022

Tópicos (México)

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El proyecto filosófico moral de Kant pretende ser una unidad articulada entre metafísica moral y antropología práctica. En sus dos trabajos en los que lleva a cabo la fundamentación de su metafísica moral, a saber, la Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres y la Crítica de la razón práctica, Kant insiste en que no toma nada en préstamo de la antropología para sustentar ese fundamento, mientras que en sus dos trabajos prácticos posteriores más importantes, la Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón y la Metafísica de las costumbres, Kant se da a la tarea de aplicar su metafísica moral a la antropología. Tomando en consideración que, para Kant, la felicidad empírica es un deseo esencial del ser humano, pero también que su metafísica moral es incoherente sin negar racionalidad y libertad a todo incentivo sensible, este artículo problematiza la posibilidad del proyecto articulado de la filosofía moral kantiana.

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Kant on Determinism and the Categorical Imperative

Cited by 6 publications

References 18 publications

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason

Kant’s Standpoint Distinction

El problema antropológico-práctico de la felicidad en la filosofía moral de Kant

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