Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility

Kant states in §76 of the third Critique that the divine intuitive intellect would not represent modal distinctions. Kohl (2015) and Stang (2016) claim that this statement entails that noumena lack modal properties, which, in turn, conflicts with Kant’s attribution of contingency to human noumenal wills. They both propose resolutions to this conflict based on conjectures regarding how God might non-modally represent what our discursive intellects represent as modally determined. I argue that (i) these proposals fail; (ii) the viable resolution consists in recognizing that we modalize human noumenal wills as a merely regulative-practical principle in our judgements of imputation.

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Noumenal Freedom and Kant’s Modal Antinomy

Abaci

2021

“… 24 On this point, I am influenced by McMullin (2013) who emphasizes the moral importance of attributing radical evil to oneself. …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…23 However, Papish herself does not want to put great weight on this particular claim in defending her interpretation (2018: 106). 24 On this point, I am influenced by McMullin (2013) who emphasizes the moral importance of attributing radical evil to oneself. 25 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Change of Heart, Moral Character and Moral Reform

Damstra

2023

I examine Kant’s claim in part one of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason that moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense (R, 6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.

“… 17 Some of the more recent and influential examples include: Wood (1999: 283–90), Louden (2000: 132–9), Grimm (2002), Allison (2002), Caswell (2006), Formosa (2007), Anderson-Gold and Muchnik (2010), Muchnik (2010), Kemp (2011), Silber (2012), Firestone and Jacobs (2013), McMullin (2013), Michalson (2014). …”

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confidence: 99%

Can Kant’s Theory of Radical Evil Be Saved?

Goldberg

2017

In this article, I assess three contemporary criticisms levelled at Kant’s theory of evil in order to evaluate whether his theory can be saved. Critics argue that Kant does not adequately distinguish between evil and mundane wrongdoing, making his use of the term ‘evil’ emotional hyperbole; by defining evil as the subordination of the moral law to self-love his analysis is seemingly overly simplistic and empirically false; and by focusing solely on the moral character of the perpetrator of evil, Kant’s theory apparently ignores the most salient aspect of evil – the suffering of victims. While I will not claim that Kant provides us with a fully adequate theory of evil, I respond to each of these criticisms and conclude that Kant’s theory can still provide significant insight into both the nature of evil and the moral psychology of perpetrators of evil.