Kant vs. Leibniz in the Second Antinomy: Organisms Are Not Infinitely Subtle Machines

Abstract

This paper interprets the two pages devoted in the Critique of Pure Reason to a critique of Leibniz's view of organisms as infinitely organized machines. It argues that this issue of organisms represents a crucial test-case for Kant in regard to the conflicting notions of space, continuity and divisibility held by classical metaphysics and by criticism. I first present Leibniz's doctrine and its justification. In a second step, I explain the general reasoning by which Kant defines the problem of the Antinomies, and then I specify the case of the Second Antinomy. Then, I ask why the organism raises specific issues for Kant's solution of the Second Antinomy, and why it sheds light on the nature of Leibniz's metaphysical assumptions about organisms. The last section considers this critique of Leibniz from the perspective of Kant's future theory of organisms in the third Critique, specifying its role in the development of a Kantian view of organisms with regard to the changes occurring at the same time in the life sciences.

Mechanism Versus Organism: A Loosely Kantian Perspective and Its Implications for Bioengineering

“…In this section, we shed light on some points of contact between Kant and Leibniz regarding the status of living beings. We thereby follow the lead of Philippe Huneman [1]. He reaches the following verdict regarding the status of living beings in the KrV: he writes, "an account of the specific status of organized beings […] is not to be found in the first Critique" (p. 183).…”

“…Ontologically speaking, living beings are machines, just very subtly organized ones, while epistemologically speaking, we will never be able to conceive a living being as a machine since our mind is finite and cannot cognize infinite structures. This, however, Huneman (p. 178) argues, is precisely where Kant correctly senses a contradiction: "according to Leibniz, one should thus consider the division [of a given organic body, RG & MT] as already achieved, albeit infinite, since it is represented in a concept (this point defines precisely what is articulation, Gliederung), and at the same time, one must conceive of it as a never-fulfilled series, since one applies here the rule of regress-which means producing an infinite division through the regress itself, the form of this division being undetermined prior to the regress" [1].…”

“…Huneman (pp. 178-179) then shows convincingly that for Kant, Leibniz confuses divisibility of a body as being in space (which is infinitely divisible) with divisibility of a body as an organism, which cannot be infinitely divisible if we are to have a concept of it [1].…”

“…Refuting the Leibnizian distinction between organisms and machines leaves the Kant of the KrV without any means to distinguish them. However, Huneman (p. 184) then cites a passage from Dreams of a Spirit Seer, where Kant confesses that Stahl's strict distinction of organisms from machines has immediately convinced him [1], a conviction that Kant was unable to cash out in metaphysical terms by the time of the KrV. In addition to this conviction of Kant, Huneman (p. 85) shows that there was a general trend in Kant's days to advocate "[…] a more "immanentistic" view of organisms-a view defining the intelligibility of organisms both within the intrinsic specific forces that characterize them and through the laws of their manifestations, instead of considering them from the viewpoint of a general mechanistic scheme for understanding nature" [1].…”

“…According to the second analogy of experience, "[a]ll alterations occur after the law of cause and effect" [2]. 1 If Kant's argument in the Analytic of Principles is conclusive, this second analogy is a requirement of our mode of cognition ("Erkenntnis"): whatever is possibly experienced by us is structured according to the Second Analogy. The same does not hold for final causes.…”