Killing Minimally Responsible Threats

Abstract

Minimal responsibility threateners (MRTs) are epistemically justified but mistaken in thinking that imposing a non-negligible risk on others is permissible. On standard accounts, an MRT forfeits her right not to be defensively killed. I propose an alternative account: an MRT is liable only to the degree of harm equivalent to what she risks causing multiplied by her degree of responsibility. Harm imposed on the MRT above that amount is justified as a lesser evil, relative to allowing the MRT to kill her victim. This hybrid account, which generalizes to those are who are more than minimally responsible, has considerable advantages. (1994): 74-94, p. 91. 2 This is Derek Parfit's terminology. He says an act "would be wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the morally relevant facts". And an act "would be wrong in the evidence-relative sense just when this act would be wrong in the ordinary sense if we believed what the available evidence gives us decisive reasons to believe, and these beliefs were true". See: Derek Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 150. Some might find this distinction unhelpful, since it adverts to a third, 'ordinary' sense of wrong. Others might think that there is no purely fact-relative sense of 'wrong' --that instead such acts, like tornadoes and diseases, are merely unfortunate. Given either worry, we can replace the claim that what an MRT does is wrong in the fact-relative sense with the claim that what she does has bad consequences, with no redeeming good consequences.

Justifying Uncivil Disobedience

“…Second, and perhaps more importantly, it matters to proportionality exactly who bears the costs of particular actions. Regarding the ethics of self-defense and war, it is widely accepted that when it comes to the distribution of costs, it is better for those who are more responsible for the wrong being addressed to bear the costs in addressing that wrong; moreover, proportionality allows more costs to be distributed to the culpable-those who freely and knowingly engage in the wrongful activities that necessitate defensive actions-in comparison to their innocent counterparts (Bazargan, 2014;Draper, 2016;Montague, 2010;Tadros, 2011Tadros, , 2012Vallentyne, 2011Vallentyne, , 2016. Applying this to uncivil disobedience, even if such activities sometimes cause much more overall harm, insofar as the harm is directed at those who are culpable, acts of uncivil disobedience can still be proportionate.…”

Authorization and The Morality of War

“…In my view, liability to lethal harm is fundamentally non-comparative: one can be liable to be killed, only if one is responsible in the right way, and to a sufficient degree, for contributing to some unjustified threat. There must be a 'fit' between one's behaviour and the severe fate of losing one's right to life [McMahan 1994: 259;Lazar 2009;Bazargan 2014]. Mere implication is not enough.…”

Not as a Means: Killing as a Side Effect in Self‐defense

“…25, No. 1 (), pp. 114–136; and Jonathan Quong, ‘Liability to Defensive Harm,' Philosophy and Public Affairs , Vol.…”