Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition

Heyes, Cecilia; Bang, Dan; Shea, Nicholas; Frith, Christopher D.; Fleming, Stephen M.

doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.02.007

Cited by 155 publications

(131 citation statements)

References 137 publications

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“…Our findings are also relevant to a recent proposal about the emergence of metacognitive ability during childhood which specifically relies on social learning (Heyes et al, 2020). The Cultural Origins hypothesis argues that children learn to reason metacognitively by watching others model good metacognition or by having a teacher guide them, rather than metacognition emerging either innately through genetic programming or through nonsocial experience.…”

Section: Alternative Theoretical Accountssupporting

confidence: 66%

Are children’s judgments of another’s accuracy linked to their metacognitive confidence judgments?

Baer

Malik

Odic

2021

Metacognition Learning

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The world can be a confusing place, which leads to a significant challenge: how do we figure out what is true? To accomplish this, children possess two relevant skills: reasoning about the likelihood of their own accuracy (metacognitive confidence) and reasoning about the likelihood of others’ accuracy (mindreading). Guided by Signal Detection Theory and Simulation Theory, we examine whether these two self- and other-oriented skills are one in the same, relying on a single cognitive process. Specifically, Signal Detection Theory proposes that confidence in a decision is purely derived from the imprecision of that decision, predicting a tight correlation between decision accuracy and confidence. Simulation Theory further proposes that children attribute their own cognitive experience to others when reasoning socially. Together, these theories predict that children’s self and other reasoning should be highly correlated and dependent on decision accuracy. In four studies (N = 374), children aged 4–7 completed a confidence reasoning task and selective social learning task each designed to eliminate confounding language and response biases, enabling us to isolate the unique correlation between self and other reasoning. However, in three of the four studies, we did not find that individual differences on the two tasks correlated, nor that decision accuracy explained performance. These findings suggest self and other reasoning are either independent in childhood, or the result of a single process that operates differently for self and others.

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Section: Alternative Theoretical Accountssupporting

confidence: 66%

Are children’s judgments of another’s accuracy linked to their metacognitive confidence judgments?

Baer

Malik

Odic

2021

Metacognition Learning

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“…Individuals who were ideologically extreme were characterized by impaired metacognition, suggesting that individuals' capacity to be aware of and to regulate their cognitive functioning may confer susceptibility to internalizing ideologies. There is growing empirical support for the idea that resistance to evidence in the socio-political sphere may therefore emerge from a neurocognitive impairment in metacognitive processes (Heyes, Bang, Shea, Frith, & Fleming, 2020;Rollwage et al, 2019;Fischer, Amelung, & Said, 2019;Kleitman, Hui, & Jiang, 2019;Sinclair, Stanley, & Seli, 2019;Morris, Savani, & Fincher).…”

Section: Empirical Support For the Neurocognitive Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Neurocognitive Model of Ideological Thinking

Zmigrod¹

2020

Preprint

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Ideological behaviour has been traditionally viewed as a product of social forces. Nonetheless, an emerging science is suggesting that ideological worldviews can also be understood in terms of neural and cognitive principles. The paper proposes a Neurocognitive Model of Ideological Thinking, which argues that ideological worldviews may be manifestations of individuals’ perceptual and cognitive systems. The Neurocognitive Model makes two essential claims. Firstly, there are neurocognitive antecedents to ideological thinking: the brain’s low-level neurocognitive dispositions influence its receptivity to ideological doctrines. And secondly, there are neurocognitive consequences to ideological engagement: strong exposure and adherence to ideological doctrines can shape perceptual and cognitive systems. The paper details the Neurocognitive Model of Ideological Thinking and synthesizes the empirical evidence in support of its claims. The model postulates that there are bidirectional processes between the brain and the ideological environment, and so it can address the roles of situational and motivational factors in ideologically-motivated action. This endeavour highlights that an interdisciplinary neurocognitive approach to ideologies can facilitate biologically-informed accounts of the ideological brain and thus reveal who is most susceptible to extreme and authoritarian ideologies. Consequently, by investigating the relationships between low-level perceptual processes and high-level ideological attitudes, we can develop a better grasp of our collective history as well as the mechanisms that may structure our political futures.

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“…I have focused on imitation, mentalizing, and language because, to date, these processes have been examined most closely from a cultural evolutionary perspective. There is also evidence that social-learning strategies (Heyes, 2018), moral reasoning (Heyes, 2019), and metacognition are culturally learned (Heyes, Bang, Shea, Frith, & Fleming, 2020). But more research is needed—in developmental, comparative, and cross-cultural psychology and in cognitive neuroscience—to find out exactly what cultural learning contributes to the development of these and other distinctively human cognitive mechanisms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychological Mechanisms Forged by Cultural Evolution

Heyes

2020

Curr Dir Psychol Sci

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The adaptive features of cognitive mechanisms, the features that make them fit for purpose, have traditionally been explained by nature and nurture. In the last decade, evidence has emerged that distinctively human cognitive mechanisms are also, and predominantly, shaped by culture. Like physical technology, human cognitive mechanisms are inherited via social interaction and made fit for purpose by culture evolution. This article surveys evidence from developmental psychology, comparative psychology, and cognitive neuroscience indicating that imitation, mentalizing, and language are “cognitive gadgets” shaped predominantly by cultural evolution. This evidence does not imply that the minds of newborn babies are blank slates. Rather, it implies that genetic evolution has made subtle changes to the human mind, allowing us to construct cognitive gadgets in the course of childhood through cultural learning.

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Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition

Cited by 155 publications

References 137 publications

Are children’s judgments of another’s accuracy linked to their metacognitive confidence judgments?

Are children’s judgments of another’s accuracy linked to their metacognitive confidence judgments?

A Neurocognitive Model of Ideological Thinking

Psychological Mechanisms Forged by Cultural Evolution

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