Knowing Social Reality: A Critique of Bhaskar and Archer’s Attempt to Derive a Social Ontology from Lay Knowledge

Abstract

Critical realists argue that the condition of possibility of the sciences is that they are based on a correct set of ontological assumptions or definitions. The task of philosophy is to underlabor for the sciences, by ensuring that the explanations developed are congruent with the ontological condition of possibility of the sciences. This requires critical realists to justify their claims about ontology and, to do this, they turn to ontological assumptions that are held to obtain in natural scientific knowledge and social agents’ lay knowledge. A number of problems with this approach are discussed and a problem-solving alternative is advocated.

Using the realist interview approach to maintain theoretical awareness in realist studies

“…It is worth mentioning some relevant criticisms that critical realism has received from both positivists and interpretivists. Regarding value-to-facts when conducting research, Bhaskar argued that we can move from values to facts with 'descriptively adequate' accounts of 'value impregnated' events (Cruickshank, 2010). Positivists contend that the use of values of human emancipation introduces bias in research endeavors because the use of values in any given situation is a judgment call.…”

Realismo crítico e estudos organizacionais: uma análise bibliométrica

“…E que essas viradas precisam ser separadas em seus pontos comuns e divergentes. Outra crítica a visão realista crítica diz respeito ao tratamento limitado da noção de falibilismo e relativismo em decorrência da ênfase na ontologia e nas contradições decorrentes do dizer o que a realidade é e o que ela não é (Cruickshank, 2010). A crítica de Cruickshank (2010) à Bhaskar e à Archer indica que para justificar suas afirmações em termos de ontologia, os realistas críticos caem em uma série de problemas.…”

The Poverty of Ontological Reasoning

“…We can now appreciate why the fact that Cook puts together the idea that concepts embody the “common sense view of the world” with the idea that language is an ontological map is a crucial step towards understanding Archer's conception (this is Bhaskar's conception too [see Cruickshank, 2010] and, more recently, Elder‐Vass's [2006, pp. 3–4]).…”

“…2 2 As Justin Cruickshank (2004; 2010) has argued, for example, the critical realist commitment to avoiding the “epistemic fallacy” (see next section) contradicts their attempted redefinition of ontology as not metaphysical, i.e. as concerned with the transitive rather than the intransitive, to use Bhaskar's terms. …”