Knowledge and Coherence

Thagard, Paul; Eliasmith, Chris; Rusnock, Paul; Shelley, Cameron

doi:10.1093/0195147669.003.0006

Cited by 14 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Due to the multiple realisability of functions and the heterogeneity of the functions that a function bearer may perform (see below, section 5), standard accounts of inference do not seem to be able to explain the coherence of two-sorted theory elements. The same holds true for the most important aspect of the approach of Thagard and co-workers, namely of explanatory and deductive relations (Thagard et al 2002). Establishing relations of such kind would result in establishing a reduction relation between both sorts of models, which was shown not to hold in the cases considered here (cf.…”

Section: Coherencementioning

confidence: 56%

“…cit.). According to Paul Thagard, among the candidates for such relations are explanatory and deductive relations as well as other mappings (e.g., Thagard et al 2002). So the second task is to inquire into the kind of relation that holds between a physicalistic and a functional model and show how this relation accounts for the coherence of the description that is made up by a combination of both models.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts

Krohs¹

2009

Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology

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A technical artefact is often described in two ways: by means of a physicalistic model of its structure and dynamics, and by a functional account of the contributions of the components of the artefact to its capacities. These models do not compete, as different models of the same phenomenon in physics usually do; they supplement each other and cohere. Coherence is shown to be the result of a mapping of role-contributions on physicalistic relations that is brought about by the concept of function. It results a sandwich-like structure of the two models, which can be reconstructed as a two-sorted theory element.Keywords: Theory structure, Theory element, Function, Transistor A technical artefact may be described in physicalistic and in functional terms. The physicalistic description accounts for structure and dynamics of the entity, while the functional description is based upon a design-and-use-centred view of the artefact. Both descriptions belong to different areas of knowledge and the question is how they cohere. Regarding the different descriptions as different models of the same entity, this question for coherence becomes a question of theory relation, i.e., of the relation between both models. To investigate this relation, I am splitting the problem of coherence into two questions. The first one is the question for consistency of the models. Though small inconsistencies would not completely corrupt coherence, they would diminish it and we should not presuppose that descriptions of technical artefacts are usually inconsistent. Consistency is reflected in theory structure, so the task is to reconstruct the structure of the "sandwich" of a physicalistic and a functional model and look whether it is consistent. Consistency alone, however, does not bring about coherence. Obviously, the junction of two isolated sets of propositions is consistent, but it would be strange to call this junction, which falls in two, coherent. Isolation has to be regarded as a feature that diminishes coherence (BonJour 1985, p. 95). Some relation must hold between the elements of physicalistic and functional descriptions that brings coherence about. Laurence BonJour regards mainly inferential relations between the elements of a class of propositions as increasing its coherence (op. cit.). According to Paul Thagard, among the candidates for such relations are explanatory and deductive relations as well as other mappings (e.g., Thagard et al. 2002). So the second task is to inquire into the kind of relation that holds between a physicalistic and a functional model and show how this relation accounts for the coherence of the description that is made up by a combination of both models.The required concepts for the reconstruction are introduced in the first section of this paper. The second section develops the structure of consistent two-model-descriptions. The third section is dedicated to the question of coherence of physicalistic and functional models. In the fourth section, I will demonstrate the application of my reconstructi...

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Section: Coherencementioning

confidence: 56%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts

Krohs¹

2009

Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology

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“…The framework, introduced by Joseph et al [14,13], is based on Thagard's formulation of the theory of coherence as maximising constraint satisfaction [21]. This theory is based on the assumption that pieces of information can be associated with each other, the association being either positive or negative.…”

Section: Coherence Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Any new information is tended to be evaluated for its coherence with the whole before accepting or rejecting. Taking this intuition to artificial systems, a coherence-based agent theory [16,21] provides the agent with a mechanism to preserve the coherence of its cognitions. With this approach, beliefs, desires or intentions are only accepted if they belong to a coherent whole.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coherence-driven argumentation to norm consensus

Joseph

Prakken

2009

Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law

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In this paper coherence-based models are proposed as an alternative to logic-based BDI and argumentation models for the reasoning of normative agents. A model is provided for how two coherence-based agents can deliberate on how to regulate a domain of interest. First a deductive coherence model presented, in which the coherence values are derived from the deduction relation of an underlying logic; this makes it possible to identify the reasons for why a proposition is accepted or rejected. Then it is shown how coherencedriven agents can generate candidate norms for deliberation, after which a dialogue protocol for such deliberations is proposed. The resulting model is compared to current logicbased argumentation systems for deliberation over action.

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“…Se pasa, entonces, a una evaluación e identificación de aquella teoría que posea mayor coherencia, o sea aquella que sea consistente, y en las que las reglas mejor se adecuen a los valores estipulados y que posea mayor poder explicativo de las decisiones disponibles, lo que puede medirse usando técnicas de medición de coherencia 49 , desarrolladas en inteligencia artificial, en la línea de tHagard, de coherencia como constraint satisfaction 50 .…”

Section: Rumbo Al Deseo De Haack: Vinculando Las Valoraciones a La Arunclassified

La lógica en el Derecho: grandes expectativas y algunas desilusiones

Maranhão¹

2009

DOXA

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La lógica en el Derecho: grandes expectativas y algunas desilusiones 229La Lógica en eL derecho: grandes expectativas y aLgunas desiLusiones * Juliano S. A. Maranhão Universidad de São PauloRESUMEN. Partiendo de la controversia entre S. Haack y E. Bulygin acerca de la lógica en el Derecho, el artículo analiza las perspectivas de usar herramientas lógicas para desarrollar modelos de la actividad de la interpretación del Derecho. Se contraponen dos concepciones de Derecho, ligándolas a diferentes representaciones lógicas: i) el Derecho como sistema de reglas correlacionado con la lógica deóntica y la lógica de revisión de creencias/normas, y ii) el Derecho como una actividad interpretativa/argumentativa vinculada con la argumentación derrotable. Usando la distinción entre lógicas de cualificación y lógicas de excepción, el artículo propone una reconciliación de ambas tradiciones, trazando un camino informal para la integración de esas herramientas lógicas. Allí se defiende una visión acerca del papel de la lógica en el Derecho que entraña más expectativas optimistas que las admitidas por Bulygin y también algunas desilusiones respecto a la propuesta de Haack.Palabras claves: Lógica deóntica, derrotabilidad, argumentación jurídica. ABSTRACT. Departing from the controversy between S.Haack and E. Bulygin about logic in the law, this paper discusses perspectives of using logical tools for modeling the activity of legal interpretation. It opposes two conceptions of law linking each to different logical representations: i) law as a system of rules linked to deontic logic and logic of belief/normative revision and ii) law as an interpretive/argumentative activity linked to logic of defeasible argumentation. Using a distinction between logics of qualification and logics of exception the paper then proposes a conciliation of both traditions sketching informally a way to integrate these logical tools. It defends a more optimistic view on logic in the law with greater expectations than that of Bulygin and with fewer delusions than those expressed by Haack.Keywords: Deontic logic, defeasibility, legal argumentation. 230Juliano S. A. Maranhão un jaque aL descriptivismo y La sistematizaciónE n un artículo reciente, S. Haack se muestra escéptica acerca del alcance y la utilidad de la aplicación de la lógica formal al Derecho 1 . En su opinión, la lógica no puede tocar, ni toca, lo esencial del fenómeno jurídico, que habría que analizar como una actividad de interpretación, i.e. como la naturaleza y razón de las proposiciones interpretativas que identifican el Derecho en determinados casos, ofreciendo criterios para hacer una interpretación preferible a otra. Para Haack, el énfasis excesivo en la estructura lógica de los sistemas normativos dada por alcHourrón y Bulygin no sería capaz de dar cuenta de la actividad interpretativa en el Derecho. Aún más: las tentativas en ese sentido con las herramientas lógicas actualmente disponibles estarían condenadas al fracaso, o a captar algo muy lateral y limitado del fenómeno jurídico. Bu...

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Knowledge and Coherence

Cited by 14 publications

References 15 publications

Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts

Structure and Coherence of Two-Model-Descriptions of Technical Artefacts

Coherence-driven argumentation to norm consensus

La lógica en el Derecho: grandes expectativas y algunas desilusiones

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