Knowledge and Lotteries

Hawthorne, John

doi:10.1093/0199269556.001.0001

Cited by 730 publications

(842 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…You will not inquire further about how the child came by that information-whether by dumb luck or from an informant that normally lies-even if you have reason to suspect such an unreliable source.) (Hawthorne [2003], pp. 68-9)…”

Section: The Upper-right Quadrantmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm¹

2006

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

288

198

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Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of ''grasping'' that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge.

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Section: The Upper-right Quadrantmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Grimm¹

2006

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

288

198

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“…This fact about the above example provides problems for so-called Subject-Sensitive Invariantist accounts of knowledge. See, for instance, Fantl and McGrath (2002); Hawthorne (2004);Stanley (2005). 4 Cf.…”

Section: What Is Epistemic Contextualism?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism1

Blome-Tillmann¹

2016

The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance

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“…See McGlynn 2011: §1 for details and defence. 24 I think a parallel point could be argued concerning the lottery variants discussed in Vogel 1990 andHawthorne 2004. Smith anticipates this worry, and argues that these lottery variants are actually unlike lottery cases and cases such as Smith's belief that the computer background is blue (2010: 21-2).…”

Section: Normical Support Degrees Of Justification and Gettier Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

McGlynn¹

2012

Episteme

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In light of the failure of attempts to analyse knowledge as a species of justified belief, a number of epistemologists have suggested that we should instead understand justification in terms of knowledge. This paper focuses on accounts of justification as a kind of ‘would-be’ knowledge. According to such accounts a belief is justified just in case any failure to know is due to uncooperative external circumstances. I argue against two recent accounts of this sort due to Alexander Bird and Martin Smith. A further aim is to defend a more traditional conception, according to which justification is a matter of sufficiently high evidential likelihood. In particular, I suggest that this conception of justification offers a plausible account of lottery cases: cases in which one believes a true proposition – for example that one's lottery ticket will lose – on the basis of probabilistic evidence.

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Knowledge and Lotteries

Cited by 730 publications

References 66 publications

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism1

Justification as ‘Would-Be’ Knowledge

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