Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error

Nagel, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.624.x

Cited by 80 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Intuitive judgments are, in general, governed by cognitive heuristics, many of which are fairly reliable in normal circumstances, and there is no special reason to think that epistemic judgments are especially unreliable [Spicer 2007;Nagel 2010Nagel , 2011; Gerken forthcoming a]. However, intuitive judgments are, in general, systematically fallible, and, again, there is little reason to suspect that intuitive epistemic judgments differ in this regard.…”

Section: Intuitive Epistemic Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Epistemic Focal Bias

Gerken

2011

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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Section: Intuitive Epistemic Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 94%

Epistemic Focal Bias

Gerken

2011

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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“…Someone who is actively wondering whether a clock might be broken cannot just glance at that very clock to tell the time, but would rationally gather further evidence before making up her mind. If the reader of a scenario is encouraged to think about the possibility that the clock might be broken, the bias of epistemic egocentrism should incline this reader to evaluate the agent described in the scenario as though she shared the reader's own active worry (Nagel, 2010).…”

Section: Evaluations Of Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Juan²,

2013

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Intuitively, there is a difference between knowledge and mere belief. Contemporary philosophical work on the nature of this difference has focused on scenarios known as "Gettier cases." Designed as counterexamples to the classical theory that knowledge is justified true belief, these cases feature agents who arrive at true beliefs in ways which seem reasonable or justified, while nevertheless seeming to lack knowledge. Prior empirical investigation of these cases has raised questions about whether lay people generally share philosophers' intuitions about these cases, or whether lay intuitions vary depending on individual factors (e.g. ethnicity) or factors related to specific types of Gettier cases (e.g. cases that include apparent evidence). We report an experiment on lay attributions of knowledge and justification for a wide range of Gettier Cases and for a related class of controversial cases known as Skeptical Pressure cases, which are also thought by philosophers to elicit intuitive denials of knowledge. Although participants rated true beliefs in Gettier and Skeptical Pressure cases as being justified, they were significantly less likely to attribute knowledge for these cases than for matched true belief cases. This pattern of response was consistent across different variations of Gettier cases and did not vary by ethnicity or gender, although attributions of justification were found to be positively related to measures of empathy. These findings therefore suggest that across demographic groups, laypeople share similar epistemic concepts with philosophers, recognizing a difference between knowledge and justified true belief.

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“…Second, I will show that these aspects will be lled in such conrmed e.g. in Schaffer and Knobe (2012), Hansen and Chemla (2013), Nagel et al (2013) and Buckwalter (2014). See below for some further remarks on the plausibility of the Contextualist Data.…”

Section: The Challenge For Invariantismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions

Dinges¹

2015

Episteme

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Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the socalled bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, rst, that the bank cases are underspecied even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will ll in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case.

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Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error

Cited by 80 publications

References 3 publications

Epistemic Focal Bias

Epistemic Focal Bias

Lay denial of knowledge for justified true beliefs

Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions

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