Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology

Anderson, Elizabeth

doi:10.5840/philtopics199523213

Cited by 193 publications

(111 citation statements)

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“…Further, the effects are small and the connection between negative associations and actual discriminatory behavior is, as is well known, contested. 4 Though philosophers often assume implicit biases are not accessible through introspection or under conscious control, 5 psychologists have largely rejected these assumptions, and now favor the view that automatic processes only tend to have a combination of features that may or may not include access and controllability [27]. Let us acknowledge these are ongoing scientific controversies, with one prominent expert going so far as to declare the IAT "completely bogus."…”

Section: What Does the Research Show?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In reply, proponents have insisted that although values should (and do) inform the context of scientific discovery (e.g., what projects are worth pursuing, hypothesis formation, etc...), they are not saying politics ought to constrain reasoning about truth or warrant [3] (pp. [81][82] [4] (p. 54). However, this is not the end of the matter.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Political Correctness in Philosophy

Hermanson

2017

Philosophies

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This paper offers an unorthodox appraisal of empirical research bearing on the question of the low representation of women in philosophy. It contends that fashionable views in the profession concerning implicit bias and stereotype threat are weakly supported, that philosophers often fail to report the empirical work responsibly, and that the standards for evidence are set very low-so long as you take a certain viewpoint.

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Section: What Does the Research Show?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Political Correctness in Philosophy

Hermanson

2017

Philosophies

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“…Recent work in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of science has emphasized the fact that science is a socially organized activity. As such, scientific research is likely to reflect values (for good or ill) that are implicit within the social processes that support it, be they the organization of universities and laboratories or the political processes that give rise to research opportunities and its financial support (Longino 1994;Anderson 1995). Furthermore, the 'knowability' of some facts or data can depend upon occupying a particular social position or embodied experience.…”

Section: Fifth Domain: Epistemology and Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

The roles of ethics in gene drive research and governance

Thompson

2018

Journal of Responsible Innovation

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Ethics research queries the norms and values that shape the goals and justification for gene drive projects, and that might lead to issue or opposition to such projects. A framework for organizing ethics research is offered. In addition to basic research ethics and risk assessment, gene drives will give rise to questions about the fiduciary responsibilities of scientists, democratizing technology, and the links between epistemology and social power relations. A final category of ethical issues covers the way in which research on norms and values is organized, funded and integrated into other aspects of a gene drive project. ARTICLE HISTORY

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“…If I come up with a list of random truths, even a list of all the actual truths, this doesn't count as a theory. I will not take on the task of defending this approach, but it may be useful to highlight some of its assumptions (See, e.g., Anderson 1995aAnderson , 1995bLongino 1990;Garfinkel 1990). …”

Section: Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In courts we ask for "the whole truth and nothing but the truth" because sometimes a selection of truths that does not do justice to the phenomenon for the purposes of the inquiry is as bad as a falsehood (Anderson 1995a). …”

Section: Theorizingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice

Kendig¹

2015

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The idea of a natural kind purports to be of something that constitutes "the world's joints" and is captured in good explanations. Traditionally, natural kinds are assumed to be "mind-independent." But a plausible account of explanation takes it to be a practice of asking and answering questions. Explanations should be evaluated as answers to legitimate questions; good answers are not always in terms of "mindindependent" kinds. Drawing on the example of sex, this paper explores some of the ways differences in the word are either marked or created by us, and how these differences matter for our explanatory purposes. I argue, following Epstein (2015), that explanatory kinds can be both anchored and grounded in social facts and, moreover, that explanatory projects -like other practical projects -depend on theoretical scaffolds to provide means toward our ends.

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Knowledge, Human Interests, and Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology

Cited by 193 publications

References 1 publication

Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Political Correctness in Philosophy

Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Political Correctness in Philosophy

The roles of ethics in gene drive research and governance

Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice

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