This paper offers an unorthodox appraisal of empirical research bearing on the question of the low representation of women in philosophy. It contends that fashionable views in the profession concerning implicit bias and stereotype threat are weakly supported, that philosophers often fail to report the empirical work responsibly, and that the standards for evidence are set very low-so long as you take a certain viewpoint.

No abstract

No abstract

RésuméJe me demande ici si les conceptions pragmatiques de la vérité peuvent être réconciliées avec les intuitions ordinaires quant à la portée de la bivalence. Je soutiens que les pragmatistes sont conduits à accepter une distinction du genre «type / occurrence» entre les formes d'une investigation et ses instanciations particulières, sous peine de banaliser leur vérificationnisme. Néanmoins, même la conception révisée que j'examine échoue à sauver les approches épistémiques de la vérité de certaines conséquences peu plausibles.

According to a surge of research findings it is all but undeniable that most people, including those who sincerely profess egalitarian beliefs, exhibit 'implicit' biases with respect to women, visible minorities, and other members of historically disadvantaged groups. These biases take the form of judgments or associations that, typically, lurk beyond introspective access and conscious control. Self-directed 'stereotype threat' is another major area of interest, in which thinking about one's group identity might provoke anxiety, avoidance, and inhibit performance in stressful contexts, such as test-taking. This research rightly draws the attention of philosophers on a number of counts, not least because they might help explain '[p]ersistent inequalities between social groups' (1:1). There are many facets to explore, including the nature of biases, their role in decisionmaking, and the implications for self-knowledge, moral responsibility, and various aspects of social policy. Some of these topics are covered in the first volume of this paired set, which advertises itself as a collection of papers bringing 'a mixture of challenges to existing approaches and promising ways forward in the metaphysics and epistemology of implicit attitudes' (1:15). The second 'integrates critical philosophical thinking with the latest empirical data' in consideration of questions of responsibility and action (2:7). Let us begin with an overview of what these works have to offer.