Koalisi Partai Politik Dan Implikasinya Terhadap Sistem Presidensial Multipartai Di Indonesia

Abstract

Artikel ini berupaya meninjau kembali praktik koalisi partai politik di tengah sistem presidensial pasca reformasi, dan menilai sejauh mana dampaknya terhadap kestabilan pemerintahan. Pasca reformasi 1998, sejumlah besar partai politik telah didirikan, menunjukkan bahwa munculnya fragmentasi politik adalah sesuatu yang tidak terhindarkan. Alih-alih melaksanakan pemerintahan secara sehat, partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk memperkuat kedudukan mereka di parlemen. Implikasi penerapan multi partai dalam sistem presidensial ini seringkali menimbulkan deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif. Sistem presidensial yang dikombinasikan dengan sistem multi partai dapat menjadi sistem yang stabil dan efektif dengan cara penyederhanaan partai politik, desain pelembagaan koalisi, dan pengaturan pelembagaan oposisi. Namun di sisi lain koalisi juga menjadi sangat berpengaruh pada stabilitas pemerintahan. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti politik hukum terkait praktik koalisi partai politik di Indonesia dan mengetahui upaya-upaya dalam praktik ketatanegaraan yang dapat merealisasikan stabilitas sistem pemerintahan presidensial pada koalisi di multi partai. Artikel ini menemukan kesimpulan bahwa model pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif yang dipilih langsung oleh rakyat justru menjadi penyebab disharmonisasi antara legislatif dan eksekutif yang mengarah kepada terjadinya kebuntuan antar kedua lembaga tersebut. Lebih-lebih apabila yang menguasai lembaga ekesekutif dan lembaga legislatif adalah dari latar belakang partai politik yang berbeda. Akibatnya, praktik koalisi seperti ini cenderung mengakibatkan lebih banyak masalah, sehingga penerapan sistem ini memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap demokrasi yang didefinisikan dan dinegosiasikan.
 This article attempts to review the practice of coalitions of political parties in the post-reform presidential system and assess the extent of their impact on the stability of the government. Post-1998 reform, a large number of political parties have been established, suggesting that the emergence of political fragmentation is inevitable. Instead of implementing a healthy government, political parties formed coalitions to strengthen their positions in parliament. The implication of implementing multi-party in the presidential system often creates deadlocks between the executive and the legislature. A presidential system combined with a multi-party system can become a stable and effective system by simplifying political parties, designing institutionalized coalitions, and organizing opposition institutions. But on the other hand, the coalition has also greatly influenced the stability of the government. By using normative juridical research methods, this article aims to examine legal politics related to the practice of political party coalitions in Indonesia and to find out the efforts in state administration practices that can realize the stability of the presidential system of government in multi-party coalitions. This article finds the conclusion that the legislative and executive election models directly elected by the people are the cause of disharmony between the legislature and the executive which leads to a deadlock between the two institutions. This is even more so if those who control the executive and legislative bodies are from different political party backgrounds. As a result, coalition practices like this are likely to cause more problems, so the adoption of these systems has a significant impact on defined and negotiated democracy.

The Implementation of Executive Toolbox during Jokowi-JK Administration in the Post-2014 Presidential Election

“…Some previous researchers, Mainwaring (1993), J. Linz & Arturo Velenzuela (1994), Cheibub (2002), as cited in Taufiqurrohman (2020), explained that generally, the presidentialism system is unfriendly and more prone to be the more defective option of the governing system. Especially for new democratic countries because of the deadlock potential and the chance of misuse of executive authority.…”