2009
DOI: 10.3917/jgem.097.0371
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L'évolution de la fonction contrôle de gestion à l'hôpital

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Cited by 10 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Expert control is no longer limited to physicians but shared with centrally appointed bureaucrats (three representatives of the state sit at the RHA board of directors and each of them has three voting bulletins) and powerful management controllers. Representatives of the Social Security form the largest group within the board of the Regional Health Agency and double up as “political coordinator.” These high‐level bureaucrats capitalize on novel management tools such as prospective hospital payment, performance management tools (eg, patient volume targets, benchmarking, guidelines, and penalties for hospitals and premiums for physicians who participate in public prevention programs), agreements defining activity volume and financing needs, and novel activity‐based accounting mechanism such as DRGs to align public providers on private care providers and restore fiscal discipline. Out of the 50 billion dollars in savings pledged by the government Hollande in its 2014‐2017 economic stabilization program, 10 billion were expected to come from the health sector…”
Section: The French Welfare Elitementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Expert control is no longer limited to physicians but shared with centrally appointed bureaucrats (three representatives of the state sit at the RHA board of directors and each of them has three voting bulletins) and powerful management controllers. Representatives of the Social Security form the largest group within the board of the Regional Health Agency and double up as “political coordinator.” These high‐level bureaucrats capitalize on novel management tools such as prospective hospital payment, performance management tools (eg, patient volume targets, benchmarking, guidelines, and penalties for hospitals and premiums for physicians who participate in public prevention programs), agreements defining activity volume and financing needs, and novel activity‐based accounting mechanism such as DRGs to align public providers on private care providers and restore fiscal discipline. Out of the 50 billion dollars in savings pledged by the government Hollande in its 2014‐2017 economic stabilization program, 10 billion were expected to come from the health sector…”
Section: The French Welfare Elitementioning
confidence: 99%
“…These reforms led to a shift in accountability from professional (physicians are primarily accountable to their peers) to managerial (the professionalization of hospital managers, “doctors as managers”) and legal forms (for instance, via a regulation of quasi‐market; Mattei, Christensen, & Pilaar, ). By law, every hospital in France has a Medical Information Unit that provides the central government with exhaustive activity data (Lartigau, ). Professional values have become plurals (Dahan, ), as exemplified by the hybridization of economic performance and professional values (Routelous, ).…”
Section: Shifting Accountability Professional Values and Central Gomentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The term "New Governance" (in French: "Nouvelle Gouverance") was coined to designate this more decentralized form of hospitals' governance in which medical departments were endowed with more autonomous decision power (Bérard, 2013). This regulatory change prompted the development of management control systems in French hospitals (Lartigau, 2009;Pépin & Moisdon, 2010). By contrast with the American managed care logic (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & Caronna, 2000), the French "managerial approach in hospitals" (Engel, Kletz, Moisdon, & Tonneau, 2000: 1), which culminated with the adoption of the "New Governance" frame, was therefore grounded on the political will to involve healthcare professionals in the management of hospitals, which until then had been the exclusive realm of administrative directors (De Pouvourville & Tedesco, 2003).…”
Section: Research Settingmentioning
confidence: 99%