La personnalisation du gouvernement municipal en Italie. L'expérience du maire de Naples

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of the new Italian local electoral law (81/93) on local politics and gouvernement. Naples and left-wing mayor Antonio Bassolino have been chosen as our case-study because he has been the most popular mayor of this new local experiment and his terms in office have been analysed as "exemplary experience" which can have general conclusions for the whole of the local government debate. We study, in particular, the impact of his election by direct suffrage in 1993 and 1997 on two areas of political life: the relationship between the Mayor and the traditional political parties and the public policy-making process. We come to the conclusion that even if this reform has not introduced any real change in terms of quality and efficiency in decision-making, it has produced in Naples a new form of personnalisation of politics, of political behaviour and of public policy-making "symbolic politics".

Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capital

“…These parties decided upon, and formally appointed by majority vote, the aldermen ( Assessori ) and mayor ( Sindaco ), which were exclusively selected from among their councillors. Local power thus rested (nearly) completely in the hands of the parties holding a majority position in the local council (Mattina and Allum, ; Bolgherini, ; Bordignon et al ., ).…”

“…Importantly, law 81/1993 also introduced a degree of ‘presidentialisation’ in Italian local governments. The mayor – rather than the members of the council – now selects and appoints two to 12 aldermen (depending on the size of the municipality) to enter into the Giunta and also decides upon the vice‐mayor (Mattina and Allum, ; Bolgherini, ; Bordignon et al ., ). In practice, the mayor generally selects aldermen and a vice‐mayor from among the elected councillors.…”

“…Identification of the relation between political dynasties and politicians’ (formal) human capital derives from a peculiarity in Italian local electoral institutions, where the mayor has – since the adoption in 1993 of law 81/1993 – the ‘power to appoint and revoke the aldermen ( Assessori ), the members of the municipal government ( Giunta )’ (Bolgherini, , p. 5) – see also Mattina and Allum () and Bordignon et al . ().…”

“…(). Moreover, the mayor has the right to appoint aldermen ‘from outside the elected municipal council’ (Mattina and Allum, , p. 60, own translation). Hence, the Italian local electoral system induces the appearance of different subsets of politicians distinguishable by their entry into local councils via an election (i.e.…”

Changes in Clientelism and Urban Government: A Comparative Case Study of Naples and Marseilles

“…The local newspapers constantly reported this activity on Bassolino’s part, seen as a great novelty by comparison with the unassuming, invisible actions of earlier mayors. Some of the literature has noted the great success of these symbolic policies from Bassolino’s Town Hall (Cilento, 2000; Mattina and Allum, 2000). At the 1997 municipal elections, Antonio Bassolino was elected with 73% of the votes.…”