I explore mismatch between firms and their managers as a source of variation in aggregate output and total factor productivity (TFP). The model is calibrated to match observations on the size distribution of US manufacturing firms, managerial compensation, and aggregate moments in the national accounts. Quantitatively, small deviations from assortative matching can have sizeable effects on output and TFP. "Cronyism," where managerial positions are allocated by status rather than talent, imposes a substantial burden on economic welfare. Moreover, the model can reconcile the seemingly contradictory evidence from numerous case studies with results from recent contributions to the assignment literature. (JEL D24, E23, L11, L60, M52, O40)O ne of the most striking facts in macroeconomics is the variation of income per capita across countries. Recent work suggests that the lion's share in these differences can be explained by cross-country variations in total factor productivity (TFP) rather than variations in human and physical capital accumulation. 1 Building on work by Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), a recent literature emphasizes misallocation as a potential explanation for low TFP. The aim of this paper is to quantitatively explore one particular form of misallocation, namely mismatch between the attributes of projects and the people who run them, as a source of aggregate productivity losses.To explore this question I embed the assignment problem of Terviö (2008) into an otherwise standard Lucas span-of-control model. The economy is populated by heterogeneous managers and projects, and a firm consists of a matched manager-project 1 Recent contributions to this literature include, among many others: Klenow and