In the standard treatment of labor economics, we assume a homogeneous and aggregated work force. The labor market is characterized by demand and supply functions, each responding to the change in real wage. While the demand curve is derived from the aggregate short-run production function, the supply curve is derived out of the labor-leisure choice problem. The aggregate utility from consumption and leisure is maximized subject to a fixed time constraint; a portion of which goes on to the labor market and the rest to leisure. It should be immediate that a rise in real wage, ceteris paribus, lowers the time spent in the labor market and adds time to leisure. The demand side of the labor market is responsive to the real wage in just the opposite manner. A rise in real wage payable to the workers lowers the demand for labor in the aggregate. In fact, the well known result on "efficiency wage" and unemployment available in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) uses this simple intuition to show that a rise in real wage may significantly lower the incidence of shirking in the workplace owing to the unemployment pressure created by the higher wage. Let us briefly elaborate on this result before providing an analytical structure of the labor market equilibrium. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) had shown that the offer of efficiency wage (meaning, wage paid above the market-clearing level of productivity/wage in a competitive system) to the workers lowers shirking on the job at the firm level. In a market characterized by a large number of identical firms, if one firm benefits by offering an efficiency wage, the other firms with full flow of information among them quickly replicate that and raise the wage too. In fact, if one firm offers efficiency wage, and others do not, then both wage and employment implications of this policy get fairly limited. Since no other firm, but one, implements the efficiency wage, the average wage still remains low, and the employment level high. Consequently, if the workers in the implementing firm lose jobs due to shirking, they are quickly rehired elsewhere (assuming that loss of jobs due to shirking does not carry a stigma), and pay only a small penalty due to shorter unemployment