Lapse of time effects on tax evasion in an agent-based econophysics model

Seibold, G.; Pickhardt, Michael

doi:10.1016/j.physa.2013.01.016

Cited by 17 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Each point is averaged over 100 independent simulations for population size N = 10 4 , and the dashed lines are just guides to the eye.Summarizing, one can see that the presence of undecided agents in the population (state s = 0) naturally reduces the number of evaders, and the implementation of public policies for punishment can be effective in controlling the tax evasion in the population, either due to fear of the undecided to being caught in an audit (if he/she becomes an evader), as by the monitoring of the tax evaders. This kind of behavior was not observed in the previous studies on the Zaklan model[13][14][15][16]18].…”

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confidence: 70%

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A three-state kinetic agent-based model to analyze tax evasion dynamics

Crokidakis

2014

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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In this work we study the problem of tax evasion on a fully-connected population. For this purpose, we consider that the agents may be in three different states, namely honest tax payers, tax evaders and undecided, that are individuals in an intermediate class among honests and evaders. Every individual can change his/her state following a kinetic exchange opinion dynamics, where the agents interact by pairs with competitive negative (with probability $q$) and positive (with probability $1-q$) couplings, representing agreement/disagreement between pairs of agents. In addition, we consider the punishment rules of the Zaklan econophysics model, for which there is a probability $p_{a}$ of an audit each agent is subject to in every period and a length of time $k$ detected tax evaders remain honest. Our results suggest that below the critical point $q_{c}=1/4$ of the opinion dynamics the compliance is high, and the punishment rules have a small effect in the population. On the other hand, for $q>q_{c}$ the tax evasion can be considerably reduced by the enforcement mechanism. We also discuss the impact of the presence of the undecided agents in the evolution of the system.Comment: 13 pages, 6 figures, accepted for publication in Physica

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confidence: 70%

“…Models of tax evasion were firstly studied by economists [8][9][10][11][12], and more recently physicists became also interested in the subject [13][14][15][16][17][18] (for recent reviews, see…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A three-state kinetic agent-based model to analyze tax evasion dynamics

Crokidakis

2014

Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications

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“…We implement this behavior by B i << J and J/T i << 1. The parameters distinguishing the different agent types are taken from Pickhardt and Seibold (2013) and Seibold and Pickhardt (2013).…”

Section: The Agent-based Econophysics Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…backaudit). This variant has been studied within an econophysics tax compliance model in Seibold and Pickhardt (2013). If tax evasion is detected in the current time period, the backaudit comprises also an inspection of the preceding b p time steps.…”

Section: The Agent-based Econophysics Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In previous work Pickhardt and Seibold (2013) and more recently Seibold and Pickhardt (2013) have extended the Ising-based econophysics approach to tax evasion toward the implementation of different agent types. This theory is able to reproduce results from agent-based economics models (Hokamp and Pickhardt, 2010) so that it should be also appropriate for a quantitative analyis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Much Rationality Tolerates the Shadow Economy? – An Agent-Based Econophysics Approach

Hokamp

Seibold

2014

Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing

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Abstract. We calculate the size of the shadow economy within a multi-agent econophysics model previously developed for the study of tax evasion. In particular, we analyze deviating behavior depending on the fraction of rational agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Two audit mechanisms are considered within our model, that are, (i) a constant compliance period which is enforced after black market activities of an agent have been detected and (ii) a backauditing method which determines the compliance period according to the particpation rate in the shadow economy within a previously preassigned time interval. We calibrate our simulation with respect to experimental evidence of tax compliance in France and Germany and give estimates for the percentage of selfish agents in these countries. This implies different policy recommendations that may work to fight the shadow economy, tax evasion, and the like.

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