Last-period problems in legislatures

Abstract

Legislatures, Last-period problems, Retiring politicians, Legislative voting, Shirking-principal-agent problems, Post-elective employment, Self-policing,

The Limits of Electoral Control: Evidence from Last‐Term Politicians

“…The first part of this result is in line with findings by, for instance, Lott (), Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing (), Rothenberg and Sanders (), and Besley and Larcinese () and is consistent with the idea that such MPs no longer face electoral constraints (see Hypothesis H1a). The second part, however, suggests that retiring MPs perceive no need to invest in human capital, connections and so on that could be helpful to get postparliamentary jobs or to prepare a postparliamentary career via outside interests (see Hypothesis 1b; see also Dabros ; Parker ; Parker and Dabros ). The size of the effects is substantively meaningful.…”

“…In this article, we directly engage with this question by focusing on one limitation of electoral control as a disciplining mechanism: Members of Parliament (MPs) in their final term by definition cannot be held to account in the next election. At least from a rational choice perspective, this would imply that such last‐term MPs will exert less effort to satisfy their citizen‐principals (Besley and Larcinese ; Dabros ; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing ; Lott ; Parker and Dabros ). In line with such a so‐called shirking proposition, final‐term MPs have repeatedly been found to record lower parliamentary activity (e.g., attendance in meetings and roll‐call votes) than MPs facing re‐election constraints (Besley and Larcinese ; Lott )…”

“…This article makes two key contributions to this literature and thereby provides important new insights concerning the boundaries of elections' disciplining power. First, last‐period shirking is traditionally understood only as “substituting leisure for work … through neglect of legislative responsibilities in the final term” (Parker and Dabros , 790). In contrast, we take into account that there might also be substitution between intra‐ and extraparliamentary work efforts.…”

“…Second, unlike most previous research on the last‐term question (for partial exceptions, see Dabros ; Lott ; Parker and Dabros ), we explicitly differentiate between various motives for leaving parliament (i.e., retirement, career change, or electoral defeat). We argue that such differentiation is essential for two related reasons.…”

Submissive Lobby Fodder or Assertive Political Actors? Party Loyalty of Career Politicians in the UK House of Commons, 2005–15

“…Two MP‐level variables pertain to electoral incentives. Since dissent can be used for personal vote seeking (e.g., Kam ), I control for whether an MP was Standing Down after the term to account for the “last‐period problem” (Parker and Dabros ) eliminating electoral incentives. The variable also relates to the idea that career‐related sanctions lose their effect if the MP decided to step down.…”