Legislatures, Last-period problems, Retiring politicians, Legislative voting, Shirking-principal-agent problems, Post-elective employment, Self-policing,

Objective. Past research shows that electoral context prompts changes in political trust. In the United States, data limitations confine this literature to status-quo affirming presidential elections. We extend previous research to unexamined contexts: elections with partisan presidential changes, midterm elections with shifts in congressional control, and nonelection periods. Method. Original panel data from 2004Original panel data from , 2005Original panel data from , 2008Original panel data from , 2010Original panel data from , and 2012 are used. Data were obtained from surveys administered to students enrolled at a large midwestern university. We compare context effects on trust and other political attitudes, and contrast trust levels among winners and losers in each context. Results. We find that trust is more malleable than most other attitudes in all periods; it is less stable in presidential elections than congressional elections; and there is no evidence of winner and loser effects. Conclusion. Our findings reveal the importance of political context in explaining the stability of trust by showing that trust levels are more changeable in certain contexts than others, specifically more changeable in presidential than in congressional elections. This article examines individual-level changes in political trust occurring in different U.S. electoral contexts. Scholars have long recognized that the political environment could affect citizen support for the political system-a concept also known as trust in government and generally measured by a question asking the degree to which the respondent trusts the federal government to do what is right (see Miller, 1974;Citrin, 1974 for a discussion of the meaning of the American National Election Studies [ANES] trust in government questions). Research examining the stability of trust across election periods has been limited, however, because the data necessary to identify whether election results reduce the support that people feel for the political system generally, or the federal government specifically, do not exist nationally. The ANES included pre-and postelection measures of trust in their 1972 and 1996 panel surveys, but the outcomes of these elections were identical in that they affirmed the status quo (an incumbent president serving under divided government). The ANES have not gathered panel data on trust in government at any other time, nor have other national surveys, and this has inhibited the specification of changes in trust brought about by political context, such as electoral outcomes that bring significant partisan changes to the presidency, Congress, or both branches.

The so-called revolving door between employment in government and industry is especially relevant to the U.S. Congress because ex-legislators are notorious for taking jobs as lobbyists. There are two prominent explanations for why they do so: Lobbying either matches the talents of former legislators due to their specialized congressional training or it represents customary ex-post payments for ex-ante legislative assistance to special interests. This article explores the former dynamic, focusing on how specialized training impacts occupational outcomes of legislators and finds strong evidence to support the notion that former legislators become lobbyists due to unique human capital. This finding somewhat qualifies the notion that possible ex-post payments are a main driver for the postelective employment choices of ex-legislators.

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<p>This paper examines a previously unidentified causal factor – White House Occupant (WHO) – in political polarization and then investigates its impact on legislative productivity and the aggregate economy. Objective pundits would agree that the United States has entered a new phase of “pandemic political polarization” because Congressional Republicans had racial resentment of Obama and they did everything to obstruct his policy agenda; and now, in retaliation and on policy issues, Democrats resent Trump. In view of the changing American electorate, we consider WHO’s race or gender or perceived religious affiliation or policy positions to be an important causal factor that will contribute to extreme political polarization in the foreseeable future. We model how political polarization will in turn depress economic growth. In addition to introducing a novel element to the ongoing research on the consequences of political polarization, this paper contributes to the broader literature by asserting that a WHO is one of the determinants of political polarization and Congressional productivity; and that the remarkable contraction in Congressional productivity during Obama’s presidency, which we found to be statistically and significantly different from the other three two-term presidents who served in the past four decades, supported this assertion.  </p>