Law and Finance in Britain c.1900

Coyle, Christopher; Musacchio, Aldo; Turner, John D.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3454588

“…Detailed studies of the way legal systems framed business and financial practices have shown that the development of financial institutions did not conform to the predictions of the theory on law and finance. Sgard (2006), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) show that the English financial market took off and achieved a high level of development in the 18th and 19th centuries without formal shareholder protection, against the argument that common law was better suited for creditors'right and spurred financial development. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005), Sgard (2006), Musacchio and Turner (2013), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) demonstrate that countries with civil law could in fact had greater flexibility in business laws and forms of corporations than countries with common law.…”

Section: The Impact Of Legal Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sgard (2006), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) show that the English financial market took off and achieved a high level of development in the 18th and 19th centuries without formal shareholder protection, against the argument that common law was better suited for creditors'right and spurred financial development. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005), Sgard (2006), Musacchio and Turner (2013), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) demonstrate that countries with civil law could in fact had greater flexibility in business laws and forms of corporations than countries with common law. Focusing on bond markets and creditor protections, Musacchio (2008) showed large variations over time in bond market size, creditor protections, and court enforcement of bond contracts, within the same legal system; too large to support a direct causal link between a legal system and future financial development.…”

Section: The Impact Of Legal Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Money, Banking, and Old-School Historical Economics

Monnet

¹

,

Velde

²

2020

SSRN Journal

0

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We review developments in the history of money, banking, and financial intermediation over the last twenty years. We focus on studies of financial development, including the role of regulation and the history of central banking. We also review the literature of banking and financial crises. This area has been largely unaffected by the so-called new econometric methods that seek to prove causality in reduced form settings. We discuss why historical macroeconomics is less amenable to such methods, discuss the underlying concepts of causality, and emphasize that models remain the backbone of our historical narratives.

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“…Detailed studies of the way legal systems framed business and financial practices have shown that the development of financial institutions did not conform to the predictions of the theory on law and finance. Sgard (2006), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) show that the English financial market took off and achieved a high level of development in the 18th and 19th centuries without formal shareholder protection, against the argument that common law was better suited for creditors'right and spurred financial development. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005), Sgard (2006), Musacchio and Turner (2013), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) demonstrate that countries with civil law could in fact had greater flexibility in business laws and forms of corporations than countries with common law.…”

Section: The Impact Of Legal Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Sgard (2006), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) show that the English financial market took off and achieved a high level of development in the 18th and 19th centuries without formal shareholder protection, against the argument that common law was better suited for creditors'right and spurred financial development. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005), Sgard (2006), Musacchio and Turner (2013), Coyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019), and Acheson, Campbell, and Turner (2019) demonstrate that countries with civil law could in fact had greater flexibility in business laws and forms of corporations than countries with common law. Focusing on bond markets and creditor protections, Musacchio (2008) showed large variations over time in bond market size, creditor protections, and court enforcement of bond contracts, within the same legal system; too large to support a direct causal link between a legal system and future financial development.…”

Section: The Impact Of Legal Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Money, Banking, and Old-School Historical Economics

Monnet¹,

Velde²

2020

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“…Based on estimates reported inCoyle, Musacchio, and Turner (2019). The Investor's Monthly Manual, however, was not comprehensive, excluding many small firms.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Was Marshall Right? Managerial Failure and Corporate Ownership in Edwardian Britain

Aldous

¹

,

Fliers²,

Turner³

2023

J. Econ. Hist.

Self Cite

3

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Alfred Marshall argued that the malaise of public companies in Edwardian Britain was due to the separation of ownership from control and a lack of professional management. In this paper, we examine the ownership and control of the c.1,700 largest British companies in 1911. We find that most public companies had a separation of ownership and control, but that this had little effect on their performance. We also find that manager characteristics that proxy for amateurism are uncorrelated with performance. Ultimately, our evidence suggests that, if Marshall was correct in identifying a corporate malaise in Britain, its source lay elsewhere.

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Law and Finance in Britain c.1900

Cited by 5 publications

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Money, Banking, and Old-School Historical Economics

Money, Banking, and Old-School Historical Economics

Money, Banking, and Old-School Historical Economics

Was Marshall Right? Managerial Failure and Corporate Ownership in Edwardian Britain

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