Law and the Use of Force in World Politics: The Varied Effects of Law on the Exercise of Military Power in Territorial Disputes

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate how international law shapes leaders' decisions regarding the use of force in the context of territorial disputes. We argue that if the legal principles relevant to the dispute are capable of suggesting a focal point, international law will have a powerful role to play in informing leader behavior. Specifically, if a focal point exists, the state that it favors will avoid using force and prefer negotiations when considering an initial challenge to the status quo. However, we expect focal points to have the opposite effect once states are involved in a militarized dispute. Under these circumstances, the state with a legal advantage will be more likely to escalate the level of military force. Using a series of statistical tests, we find strong support for our theoretical argument.

The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes

“…3 Moreover, historical justifications, such as reference to a former treaty settlement, are noted by geographers to be the most common and often the most powerful justifications for claims (Burghardt 1973; Murphy 1990). Given the wide use of historical justifications and their integration into some of the key legal principles relevant to territorial claims, they have special appeal in the international system (Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011; 2012; 2013).…”

History as a double-edged sword

“…Prorok and Huth (2015) relatedly show that territorial transfers consistent with international legal principles are more likely to be lasting and lead to peace. This makes sense in tandem with the findings of Gibler and Tir (2010), as disputes in which international law clearly points toward a particular solution are known to be less violent and more ripe for peaceful settlement (Huth, et al, 2011, 2012, 2013).…”

The sound of silence: Power, secrecy, and international audiences in US military basing negotiations

“…A statistically significant and positive rho indicates that the unmeasured factors that affect the sending state’s equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way. A significant and negative rho, on the other hand, indicates that the common unmeasured factors affect the two equations in an opposite manner (Greene, 1997: 906–911; Huth and Allee, 2002: 189–191; Huth et al, 2012: 24; Zorn, 2002: 156–157). I estimate a bivariate probit model to examine the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions to go public during each negotiation round.…”